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I. INTRODUCTION
The dramatic expansion of federal power since the New Deal has produced
profound doctrinal, social, and political changes. It also presents a profound
paradox. While expansive federal power has been an engine for advancement
of progressive ideals, it also is a threat to the liberty those ideals seek to
enhance. For American minorities, the paradox is striking. 1 Expanded federal
power has yielded the benefits and protections of the civil rights era. But the
foundation of that power is a constitutionalism that unbridles collective power
and thus invites majoritarian abuses.
The danger grows from the perhaps inevitable conflict between rights and
power. Harvard's Richard Fallon has explored this tension, arguing that rights
and power in modem American constitutionalism are conceptually
interdependent: "We have no way of thinldng about constitutional rights
independent of what powers it would be prudent or desirable for government to
have." 2 In an era where substantive boundaries on federal power seem
ephemeral at best, this suggests that what we call rights may be primarily fair
weather or illusory barriers to the exercise of power.
However, on at least one view of it, this may be of little practical
significance. From a majoritarian perspective, the shifting boundary between
rights and powers, and the capacity of power to consume rights, may be
unproblematic and even attractive. If the exercise of plenary power reflects
majority will, then we might say this exercise renders a balance between rights
and powers that best reflects our current problems, ambitions, and fears. Indeed
we might view the alternative of a more formalist structure, in which
constitutional language imposes (at least until formally changed) solid and
frustrating substantive boundaries on power, to be foolishly inflexible.
But this majoritarian critique masks a core danger that is revealed when the
issue is viewed from a minority perspective. From a minority perspective the
view that conceptually unlimited federal power renders the balance between
rights and power that best reflects our current needs is paradoxical at best.
Critical race theorists have argued that America's unfailingly majoritarian
doctrinal, political, and social framework presents a multitude of dangers and
problems that are principal barriers to racial reform. From these critiques, we
can understand that dissolving power boundaries might coincidentally produce
results beneficial to minority interests (and in the case of 1960s civil rights laws
1 From a global perspective, people of-color are not minorities. Where efficient, I will
use "American" minorities.
2 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L.




vitally important results) but will not predictably yield the balance of rights and
powers that minorities would consider prudent, necessary, or attractive. The
dilemma and danger for minorities is that plenary power tethered merely by
majoritarian preferences and necessities leaves minorities simply to gamble on
the direction of future swings in the mood of the majority.
This danger drives the framework of this Article. Part II constructs the
position that the conceptual interdependence of rights and powers in a plenary
power environment (a) renders rights illusory, and (b) tethers power to
majoritarian preferences and necessities.
Part III tests the assertion of a rights-corroding plenary power
constitutionalism, by examining three provisions of the Bill of Rights that in the
modem era have been disparaged, ignored, and essentially cast out of the
Constitution-the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. 3 Part m posits that
the illusion of rights in plenary power constitutionalism can only be maintained
convincingly where the right is grounded in values that are nominally
independent of the principle of limited federal power. I argue that the perceived
and relative absence of such independent values in these three outcast
provisions, their more direct dependency on the principle of limited power and
pervasive conflict with plenary power, explains their condition as outcasts. That
condition, I contend, is evidence of a plenary power constitutionalism that can
only feign to respect rights where it is possible to submerge their dependency
on the principle of limited power.
Part IV engages, from a critical race perspective, 4 the idea that the only
harness on plenary power is a practical one defined by prevailing political
preferences and perceptions of necessity. In that exercise, I illustrate the
paradox of the plenary power constitutionalism for brown5 people. Building
3 It is my implicit contention that exercises in rights protection are primarily fair weather
efforts. I have not attempted to make this case directly. Nor have I speculated what it would
take for particular rights to fall to majoritarian fears or passions; rather, I make this case by
inferences from ideas that remain in our constitutional text but have fallen out of our modem
jurisprudence.
4 See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated
Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REv. 461 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Critical Race
Theory] (extensive bibliography identifying and describing ten major themes that broadly
characterize critical race theory); see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race
Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. CoLo. L. REv. 159
(1995) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Critical Race Theory 1993] (updated bibliography of
works in critical race theory).
51 use "brown" because black is underinclusive and misdescriptive. I have always
thought of myself as black. I came of age as colored and negro were phasing out-a time
when "black" was pulled out of the pool of epithets and elevated. See Clayton P. Alderfer &
David A. Thomas, The Significance of Race and Ethnicity for Understanding Organizational
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upon common arguments in critical race theory, Part IV posits that the
preferences and necessities that are the practical boundaries on plenary power
are inevitably majoritarian, which I contend pressures plenary power
constitutionalism to validate exercises of power that are responsive to
majoritarian fears or perceptions of necessity.
Under this pressure, plenary power constitutionalism is arguably as great a
danger to American minorities as a more formalist, power-limiting
constitutionalism that some consider the domain of contemporary political
conservatives. But paradoxically, the practical political gains made by
minorities in the civil rights movement are grounded solidly in the modem
plenary power structure. This paradox generates a concurrent theme in Part IV,
one that is implicit in nearly every critical race critique, but which demands
explicit attention here.
One of the core controversies in critical race theory surrounds the idea that
Behavior, 1988 INT'L REV. OF INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 1, 9 ("The racial and
ethnic identification of individuals is not a static condition. [For example,] Cross (1975)
analyzed the negro-to-black conversion experience."). But my lineage, like that of many
"black" people, includes equally suffering Native Americans and also Europeans who jumped
into my gene pool and then fled responsibility. Descriptively, I am brown. My children, who
add Poles and Czechs to their family tree, are brown. A full description of ethnicity is a
longer conversation.
I gave a speech recently to prospective minority applicants to our law school. I said that
the law needed them not for their "beautiful brown faces," but because of their different
perspectives and experiences. I did not say "black faces" because everyone was brown.
Descriptively, brown is more inclusive.
The disconnection we are forced into through use of the narrower label "black" is
illustrated in Kim Crenshaw's description of the exploitation of brown people for political
purposes: "Morgan recounts how the planters 'lump[ed] Indians, mulattoes and Negroes in a
single slave class,' and how these categories became 'an essential if unacknowledged,
ingredient of the republican ideology that enabled Virginians to lead the nation."' Kimberle
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment. Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1374 (1988) (quoting EDMUND MORGAN,
AMERICAN SLAVERY-AMERICAN FREEDOM (1975)). The Indians and arguably the mulattoes
to which Morgan initially refers fit into the shorthand "black" only if we expand the term well
beyond its descriptive boundaries.
I do not use "African-American" because it is not nationality or African culture that
binds brown people. Rather, it is the fact that our brown skin threatens to earn us different
treatment-mostly poor. This experience we share regardless of country of origin. See
generally Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration
Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle As Racial History, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425 (1990)
(recounting majoritarian mistreatment of Native Americans, Chinese laborers, Bracero
programs, and racist immigration quotas to show majoritarian mistreatment of minorities for
psychic or pecuniary advantage).
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scholars of color possess special perspectives on legal and social questions. It is
argued that this "voice of color" 6 can produce uniquely outsider critiques of
law and policy that cannot be duplicated by non-minorities. Moreover, some
contend that minority scholars, particularly if they depart from traditional or
dominant minority views, can shift out of voice and instead reflect a majority
perspective.7 These contentions open important debates about the functions,
boundaries, and ultimate utility of voice of color.
It is especially appropriate that I engage these questions here, particularly
the idea that voice does not permit certain unorthodox views since, in the
process of illustrating the paradox of plenary power, I construct both orthodox
and counter-instinctive minority critiques of plenary power constitutionalism
and the outcast provisions. The orthodox critique concludes that the outcast
provisions are unlikely sources of salvation for minorities and that minorities
cannot sensibly withdraw support for plenary power constitutionalism because it
is the foundation for vital legislative gains. The counter instinctive critique is
grounded, ironically, in observations from critical race scholarship about the
capacity of collective ideals to shame majorities into corrections of conditions
that violate those ideals-a force that critical race scholars argue substantially
influenced the gains of the civil rights era. From this critique we can understand
institutional and cultural fidelity to limited power to be precisely the type of
collective ideal that restrains majoritarian power-a restraint that plenary power
constitutionalism corrodes.
From the idea that these drastically divergent positions can be pursued
solidly within voice of color, Part IV.C moves toward the broader claim that
voice may prompt diverse, nontraditional routes through which scholars of
color and brown people generally can approach social, doctrinal and policy
choices, but is ill equipped to command particular selections among those
choices.
6 The initial controversy has been over the very existence of "voice." For a general
overview of the voice of color debate, see Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color,
100 YAr.LE L.J. 2007, 2062 (1991) ("I contend that the debate over the exitence of the voice
of color has concluded.").
7 Jerome Culp suggests that battles over the existence and character of voice of color
confuse "voice," which all scholars of color have, with "black perspective," which has
tighter boundaries and requirements. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Voice, Perspective,
Truth and Justice: Race and the Mountain in the Legal Academy, 38 LoY. L. REv. 61, 68
(1992). I believe this distinction is false and that there are as many variations of both voice
and black perspective as there are variations in race experiences. The existence of these
variations does not diminish the fact that, driven by broadly similar interests, we can and
should link arms. But, in the details, there is no solid basis for asserting that some
perspectives are blacker than others.
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II. RIGHTS POWER DISSONANCE IN A PLENARY POWER ENVIRONMENT
Chief Justice Rehnquist has called the principle of limited federal powers
"one of the greatest 'fictions' of our federalist system." 8 Richard Epstein
observes, "Today's welfare state rests on a construction of the commerce clause
that grants the federal government jurisdiction so long as it can show (as it
always can) that the regulated activity... affects interstate commerce, however
indirectly." 9 Robert Bork contends that "the expansion of Congress's
commerce, taxing and spending powers has reached a point where it is not
possible to state that, as a matter of articulated doctrine, there are any limits
left." 10 Predictably, the most caustic observations about the plenary nature of
federal power in modem America 1 arise as conservative complaints. But with
the progressive agenda grounded solidly on expansive federal power, there is
understandably no liberal disagreement rigorous enough to offer substantive
power boundaries.12
The Court's most recent and candid engagement of modem plenary power
appears in United States v. Lopez, 13 which has been the only significant defeat
of federal commerce power since the 1930s. Responding to what was a very
standard rendition of the power-sustaining construction of the Commerce
Clause-an unremarkable position that had been overwhelmingly successful for
decades' 4-the Court in Lopez concluded:
8 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 307 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
9 Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv.
1387, 1387 (1987).
10 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMTING OF AMERICA: THE PoLTcAL SEDUCION OF THE
LAw 158 (1990).
11 I refer here not to Congress's acknowledged plenary power over interstate commerce,
see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 17, 46, 197 (1824), but rather to the
controversial transformation of that power over commerce into power over virtually
everything.
12 There are of course numerous liberal projects focusing on rights, in which it is
assumed those rights act as independent constraints on government power. The position here
is that they do not function as such, absent a serious affirmative commitment to limited
power. See infra text accompanying note 23.
13 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act as an
unconstitutional assertion of commerce power). Alfonso Lopez was prosecuted under the Act
for violating the federal prohibition against possession of a firearm within the federally
defined school zone. Id. at 1626.
14 Justice Breyer articulated this position in his dissent:
[The majority's holding runs contrary to modem Supreme Court cases that have upheld
1560 [Vol. 57:1555
PLENARY POWER
Under the theories that the Government presents... it is difficult to perceive
any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law
enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign. Thus,
if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit
any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate....
Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down [the road
toward converting the commerce power into a general police power]. The
broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional
expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require
us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not
presuppose something not enumerated .... 15
While there is obvious tension between the rhetoric of Lopez and the
contention that federal power remains effectively plenary, I argue in Part I1B
that the impact of Lopez on the plenary power structure should be gauged not
by its power-limiting rhetoric, but by the Court's treatment of the remaining
outcast provisions in its wake. Pending those signals, I proceed under the view,
reflected in part by Justice Souter's dissent, that the majority's "reasoning and
its suggestions [are] not quite in gear with the prevailing standard, but [Lopez
is] hardly an epochal case." 16 For the moment, it is a fair premise that the
plenary power model, with perhaps a soft spin to the right, survives Lopez.
The implications of plenary power constitutionalism are profound.
Instinctively one is left to wonder, if power is plenary what are we to make of.
rights? Are they merely comforting symbols that survive in fair weather but
wither in the storm of exigency? 17 Separately, if federal power has no
congressional actions despite connections to interstate or foreign commerce that are less
significant than the [connections in this case] ....
... Mhe Court's holding... threatens legal uncertainty in an area of law that,
until this case, seemed reasonably well settled....
... Upholding this legislation would do no more than simply recognize that
Congress had a "rational basis" for finding a significant connection between guns in or
near schools and (through their effect on education) the interstate and foreign commerce
they threaten.
115 S. Ct. at 1662, 1664, 1665 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 1632, 1634.
16 Id. at 1657 (Souter, J., dissenting).
17 Milner Ball observes:
According to one "familiar understanding," the primary defense against abuse of
power is not rights but the division of power: "Political Liberty is to be found... only
1996]
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conceptual limits, what sets its transient practical boundaries? Can we say that
anything other than prevailing perceptions of prudence and necessity harness it?
Richard Fallon's conceptual interdependence project helps us engage these
questions. The idea that rights wither against necessity-driven plenary power is
readily drawn from Fallon's claim that rights and powers are conceptually
interdependent.1 8 Fallon argues, "[We] have no way of thinking about
constitutional rights independent of what powers it would be prudent or
desirable for government to have.... Modem constitutional discourse tends to
blur analysis of the scope of governmental powers with assessment of practical
necessity." 19 He contends that conceptual interdependence is exhibited most
clearly in cases involving the Court's amorphous balancing test.20 But even for
"rights-protective" doctrine, he argues, the "crucial conceptual point is that
practical necessity limits the right. The right is not defined by some process
independent of and external to consideration of the sensible scope of
government powers." 21 Self-consciously, Fallon ponders whether "the claim
that individual rights are too conceptually interconnected with government
powers to function as independent constraints may seem so obvious as to be
unilluminating. " 22
Fallon presents Ronald Dworkin's "rights thesis" as representative of the
best projects which urge, contrary to Fallon's view, that we can derive rights
when there is no abuse of power[.J... To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the
very nature of things that power should be a check to power." Accordingly, our
constitutional system divides power between state and federal government and then
among the branches of each.
Milner S. Ball, Afterthoughts, 27 GA. L. REv. 473, 478 (1993) (quoting CtR us D.
MoNTFsQUIEu, THE SPIrT oF LAws 69 (Thomas Nugent, trans. 1952) (1748)).
18 See Falon, supra note 2, at 344-45.
19 Id. at 348; see also Epstein, supra note 9, at 1392 ("The rationale for limited
government became obscure in an age when the Progressive tradition of good government
came to dominate American intellectual life. Judges who were persuaded that national
solutions were needed for national problems could hardly be expected to invoke the
commerce clause as a barrier.... ").2 0 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 360.
21 Id. at 360-61. Approaching the point at which he diverges from Fallon, Professor
Friedman candidly describes federal power as an outgrowth of necessity. See Barry
Friedman, Trumping Rights, 27 GA. L. REv. 435, 451 (1993). I discussed this phenomenon
in an earlier examination of the Tenth Amendment in the context of an arguably
unconstitutional environmental statute. See Nicholas J. Johnson, EPCRA's Collision with
Federalism, 27 IND. L. REV. 549 (1994). As Friedman points out, it is not always readily
ascertainable what "practical" necessity requires. This difficulty will have its own variable
restraining influence on the practical boundaries of power. See Friedman, supra, at 453.22 Fallon, supra note 2, at 344.
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independent of any consideration of the powers government should have-that
rights trump power. He contends that Dworkin's willingness to "weight" rights
is an essential acknowledgment that rights "cannot be defined independently of
an inquiry into the powers of government." 23 Thus "even the most staunchly
rights-based of contemporary constitutional theories accepts [the conceptual
interdependence of rights and powers] as a fact that must be explained and
rationalized. ",24
Fallon ultimately concludes that conceptual interdependence can be handled
in a way that takes rights seriously. It requires an honest balancing25 of rights
interests against power interests in which both rights and powers have a genuine
chance to prevail. 26 This necessity for balancing, he contends, has important
implications for the type of judges we ought to prefer and for the areas of law
in which courts should adopt a more aggressive role.27
Here I depart from Fallon. I contend that in a plenary power environment,
a balance between rights interests and power interests cannot be struck In a way
that truly respects rights-that conceptual interdependence in a plenary power
environment renders rights merely fair weather protections. Fallon's own
23 Id. at 370-71 (critiquing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEIUouSLY (1977)).
24 Id. at 371.
25 In a critique of balancing, Barry Friedman notes that the difficult job of quantifying
the state's interest "is cake compared to the individual right side.... This subjectivity of
valuing interests may be the very point best made by Sitz.... The majority characterized the
intrusion as 'slight.' Justice Stevens conjured up images of terror and Nazi Germany."
Friedman, supra note 21, at 454, 457.
Inserting an injured minority right should make this problem utterly intractable. Indeed,
Justice Stevens's observation in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 463
(1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting), that some citizens, even law-abiding ones, will view a
random check roadblock as far more than a slight intrusion, should resonate deeply for brown
people. See also Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 ltcH. L. REv. 1971, 1974 (1990)
(arguing that members of the Supreme Court hail mostly from the majority and therefore
cannot easily decide a case in a counter-majoritarian manner).
2 6 Fallon offers several ideas geared to facilitate this result. See Fallon, supra note 2, at
361. He argues for a broad judicial role in which judges must be very careful in deferring to
"more competent" experts in weighing competing rights and power interests. He notes the
temptation to defer to experts but emphasizes the danger that, while experts on the scene
surely may know more than courts about the interests supporting claims of government
power, they may be less sensitive to the interests underlying claims of constitutional rights.
See id. at 382.
27 See id. He also contends that judges' central mission of balancing rights interests
against power interests has implications for the type of justices we ought to select and for the
doctrinal areas in which courts should adopt a more aggressive role. See id. at 382-89; see
also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Further Reflections on Rights and Interests: A Reply, 27 GA. L.
REv. 489, 500 (1993).
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illustrations of conceptual interdependence in operation help build the fair
weather rights point. For example, even for "presumptively protected rights"
the scope of those rights, Fallon contends, "depends pervasively on a balancing
of the interests underlying the rights against the interests supporting the
recognition of governmental powers." 28 In a discussion of presumptively
protected speech, he suggests that the boundary of the right is found where
power interests outweigh speech interests or at the point where precluding
government from protecting nonspeech interests would produce unacceptable
results. 29
Inherent in this argument is that both rights interests and power interests
can evolve and the line of demarcation can oscillate to expand or constrict the
scope of either rights or powers. However, the absence of solid power-limiting
principles in plenary power constitutionalism, 30 and the enormous resources
committed to developing and sustaining power-asserting legislation, makes the
collective impulse to exert power to solve new and growing problems a much
more dynamic and dominant force in this balance.31 Rights-protecting efforts,
28 Fallon, supra note 2, at 362.
29 Id. Although Fallon's thesis speaks principally in terms of a conflict between "rights
interests" and "power interests," it does periodically reflect the idea of necessity-driven
plenary power that helps frame my analysis. In his transition into a different aspect of the
analysis, Fallon summarizes: "So far I have been talking about explicit judicial balancing of
asserted private rights against the claimed practical necessity of upholding government
power." Id. at 361. Fallon also reflects this idea as he ponders the significance of the
conceptual interdependence thesis, noting that it might fairly be cast as "the necessary
compromise of a body of law committed to individual rights with an unhappy and recalcitrant
reality." Id. Finally, Fallon writes of the Court's attention to "the practical need for
government to be able to regulate even-handedly, without recognizing exceptions to generally
prevailing duties for those with religious reasons for non-compliance." Id. at 363 n.81 (citing
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80, 889-91
(1990) (finding the Free Exercise Clause does not preclude enforcement of state statute
proscribing ingestion of peyote against persons using it as part of religious ritual)).
30 The idea that rights trump powers is not the type of textual power-limiting principle to
which I refer. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
31 In a discrete example, Fallon observes something similar: "[,]ithin our constitutional
order, the well-being, agency, and dignitary interests that underlie rights frequently are treated
as being of lesser weight than the interests that support assertions of governmental power."
Fallon, supra note 2, at 365.
It is not surprising that the Court has acknowledged the power of emergency
circumstances to dissolve principled limitations on power. In National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overrded, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985), the Court acknowledged:
The limits imposed upon the commerce power when Congress seeks to apply it to the
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dependent substantially on private initiative and resources, pale in comparison.
This dominance of power interests invites a decline toward fair-weather rights
that function only so long as there is an inadequate perception of need for
rights-dissolving assertions of power. 32
This contention is difficult to prove because the provisions that have
become the core conception of the Bill of Rights are grounded to different
degrees in a variety of values that nominally can sustain rights, independent of
any consideration of the boundaries of power. 33 These nominally limited-
power-independent values permit us to talk about and enforce certain rights as if
they were solid, self-sustaining constraints on power. Their illusory character is
difficult to demonstrate absent sufficiently severe political or social foul weather
in which I contend plenary power will dissolve rights.34
However, Part III demonstrates that there are certain provisions of the Bill
of Rights-the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments-wherein the conflict
between constitutional protections and plenary power is more open. These
provisions are less susceptible to an illusory rhetoric of respect because they are
only minimally, if at all, grounded on limited-power-independent values. The
principle of limited federal power is the predominant value that frames them.
The outcast status of these provisions can be explained by the conceptual
interdependence thesis and is inferential evidence of a plenary power
constitutionalism that renders rights illusory generally. 35
States are not so inflexible as to preclude temporary enactments tailored to combat a
national emergency. "[A]lithough an emergency may not call into life a power which has
never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living
power already enjoyed."
Id. at 853 (quoting Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 338 (1917)).
This remark was a comment on the decision in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542
(1975), which allowed Richard Nixon's wage and price controls as a response to "an
extremely serious problem which endangered the well-being of all the component parts of our
federal system and which only collective action by the National Government might forestall."
National League, 426 U.S. at 853.
32 This notion suggests a partially dormant plenary power that submerges the inevitable
rights-powers dissonance and permits us to talk about rights as though they have independent
substantive power.
33 Such limited-power-independent values seem to be at the core of rights based theories
such as Dworkin's, which claim that rights have independent force. See supra text
accompanying notes 23-24.
34 Turned more finely, a risk exists under a traditional power-limiting structure as well.
As I will argue in Part IV, open adherence to plenary power unleashes majoritarian excesses
earlier. See infra Part V.A.
35 Since I have included the Tenth Amendment in my list of outcasts, I am of course
19961 1565
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
A separate implication of plenary power constitutionalism-that power is
harnessed merely by prevailing political preferences and perceptions of prudent
or necessary problem-solving-tempts us to consider the illusory rights
observation unproblematic. Indeed, we might prefer a structure that grants us
conceptually unlimited power to solve our problems. We might say that
structure provides precisely the balance of rights and powers that best respects
our current values and serves our current interests. Fallon's vision of an
appropriate balance struck between rights interests and power interests seems to
rest on this idea.
But that vision stops short of an important question that exposes the dangers
and the paradox of the plenary power model: What exactly do "we" mean by
"our" sense of prudent or necessary problem solving?36 Whose interests are we
talking about? One might respond again, ours-American interests. But critical
taking liberty by using the term "rights" as a short hand-the same license taken when we
refer to the "Bill of Rights." What I identify are barriers that protect a category of interests
against assertions of federal power. As the Court recognized in New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992), federalism protects the interests of individuals, not just states or
state officials.36 Professor Tribe, for example, urges that our view of the Constitution should not be
limited by the wooden intentions of the framers, but rather should grow in the model of the
common law. See LAURENCE H. TiBE & MicaEn. C. DoRe, ON READiNG Tm
CoNSrrrtuoN (1991). Susan Estrich contends that this view is attractive in part because it
renders the "right results." See Susan Estrich, Book Review, HARv. L. BULL. 24 (Oct. 1991)
(reviewing TRIBE & DoRF, ON READ NG Tm CONSTrunON).
If one has faith that we will wisely and fairly use the capacity to make whatever national
decisions seem prudent and necessary, it is easy to endorse Estrich's critique of Tribe's
position. But from a critical race perspective, detached from traditional political allegiances,
this common law framework is troublesome. It is grounded on our common experience, our
shared values. If the experience and perspectives that drive the common law are majoritarian
experiences that devalue minority interests, the model is problematic. Moreover, if the
constitutional touchstone is merely whether government action is responsive to a current
problem, it leaves outsiders with no good conceptual foundation for claiming that majority
power is being used unconstitutionally against them.
While overtly flexible constitutional schemes are offered mainly by liberals and
progressives of goodwill, it would be foolhardy for brown people to permit past allegiances to
pull us down a path that requires more trust in the institutions of American government than is
deserved. See also Derrick A. Bell, Jr. & Preeta Barsal, The Republican Revival and Racial
Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1619 (1988) (critiquing Frank Michelman's and Cass Sunstein's
theory that republicanism can lead to fuller participation in public life for minorities and
voicing skepticism about its reliance on courts to recognize "voices from the margin");
Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left-Right Parallels in Recent Writing About Race, 91
COLuM. L. Rav. 1547 (1991) (arguing that liberalism today is practically bankrupt as a
source of civil rights reform).
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race theorists have argued that those interests, preferences, and necessities are
unfailingly majoritarian. 37
In his first annotated bibliography of the discipline, Richard Delgado
identifies as one of the major themes of critical race theory the lament "that a
principle obstacle to racial reform is majoritarian mindset-the bundles of
presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared cultural understandings" that
undergird American doctrinal, social, and political decisions. 38 Mainstream
writers have made roughly parallel claims. Thomas Merrill notes, "To be sure,
political scientists have persuasively argued that the Court inevitably conforms
its views about the Constitution to the demands of the dominant political
coalition. "39
Toward the extremes this majoritarian mindset presents a substantial danger
for outsiders, particularly in a scheme where power is conceptually unbridled.
Political theorist John Rawls makes the point aggressively: "[l]n the long run a
strong majority of the electorate can eventually make the constitution conform
to its political will. This is simply a fact about political power as such. There is
no way around this fact .... "4
Importantly, Rawls's observation reveals that the alternative to plenary
power constitutionalism, a model of claimed fidelity to limited power, is itself
only a transient barrier to majoritarian abuses. Consequently, the value of
cultural and institutional fidelity to limited power will not be to bar majoritarian
abuses. If it has any virtue, it is to delay them. Drawing upon critical race
theory projects that critique rights discourse as contingent and transient, but still
vital to the interests of minorities, I argue in Part IV that fidelity to limited
power is a conceptually interconnected and equally vital protection of minority
37 Fallon cites Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), to illustrate the
presence of conceptual interdependence in even the "most rights-protective" doctrine:
"Government can regulate even political speech, for example, to serve a compelling
governmental interest. Government can also use racial classifications if the need is perceived
as sufficiently urgent." Fallon, supra note 2, at 360. Korematsu illustrates the relative ease
with which majoritarian necessities will trump minority rights in an emergency, even in a
structure that rhetorically adheres to power limitations. In a structure without even that
rhetorical commitment, the danger of such things is even greater. See also infra Part IV.A.38 Delgado & Stefancic, Critical Race Theory, supra note 4, at 462. Delgado presents an
array of critical race theory projects that explore the implications of this contention in various
doctrinal and policy contexts. See also Abner S. Green, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About
Equaity, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8-16 (1996) (arguing that assertion of "our" collective
interests in resolving the rights/power balance improperly assumes legitimate sovereignty over
religious minorities).
39 Thomas W. Merrill, A Modest Proposal for a Political Court, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB.




If this is so, then American minorities must grapple with the paradox that
plenary power constitutionalism has cut a path toward our liberation, and yet,
where minority interests conflict with the majoritarian ambitions or fears,
remains a fundamental danger. Part IV engages that paradox.
III. TRASHING FOR INSIGHT
"I draw your attention to the curious incident of the dog that did nothing in the
night-time."
Sherlock Holmes 41
Suzanna Sherry observes that the Ninth Amendment "is often lumped with
the Second, Third and Tenth, as one of those amendments that doesn't mean
anything today." 42 My aim here is to examine the nature of power and the
condition of rights in modem constitutionalism by rummaging through the
constitutional ashpile, on the suspicion that what we have thrown out reveals as
much as a shelf-full of fair-weather rhetoric. What inferences can we draw then
from the dearth of Second and Ninth Amendment jurisprudence and a Tenth
Amendment that came within a whisker of being construed into oblivion?43
411 have taken liberties with Conan Doyle in presenting Holmes's observation about the
significance of things absent. For the full exchange between the fictional sleuth and Inspector
Gregory, see SiR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOiRs OF SHERLOCK
HoLMES (1894), reprinted in THE COMPL= SHERLOCK HOLMES 347 (Doubleday 1988).
42 Suzanna Sherry, "Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty," 78 MINN. L. REv. 61,
65 (1993).
4 3 See discussions of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), and infra Part III.B. See also William Van Alstyne, The
Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1239 (1994)
(discussing how the Second Amendment has generated almost no useful body of law).
Professor Van Alstyne contends that the absence of useful modem case law on the Second
Amendment is not due to the absence of occasion to develop such law-"[s]o much is true
only of the Third Amendment." Id. Query whether serious people would consider the Third
Amendment to be an inviolate barrier against the emergency of housing troops in private
homes. The plenary power structure leaves this question open. I do not include the Third
Amendment in my list of outcasts because it is less openly limited-power-dependent.
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A. The Outcast Provisions: A Shared Dependency on Substantive Power
Boundaries
Evaluated independently, the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments have
been dubbed "embarrassing," 44 "terrifying," 45 "forgotten, " 46 "mysterious," 47
"missing" 48 and "dead." 49 But they may share more than just outcast status. I
propose that they have been independently disparaged for a common reason:
They appear at the top of a hierarchy of rights that depend increasingly for their
cogency on the constitution's battered power-limiting principles.
As described above, Professor Fallon argues that rights and powers are
conceptually interdependent; but certain rights may be more dependent on
limited power than others.50 As Richard Epstein observes:
If the constitutional limitations on federal powers were designed to act as a
substitute Bill of Rights, then the expansive interpretation of the commerce
clause has done away with this protection completely. The necessary effect is
that greater burdens are placed upon the substantive limitations, such as the Bill
of Rights, found elsewhere in the Constitution. These limitations have met with
varying fates themselves .... In some cases, the second barrier against
expanded government has held. In other cases, chiefly those concerning
economic liberties, it has crumbled, leaving liberty at the mercy of the "good
faith" of the Congress whose mischief the barrier was designed to constrain. 51
Randy Barnett makes the point in a different context. In a criticism of the
44 See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 637
(1989).
45 See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terifying
Second Amendnent, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 551 (1991).
46 See BENtT B. PATrERSON, THE FORGoTrEN NumnI AmErN NrT 1-3 (1955).
47 See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 Cm.-
KENrL. REv. 131, 143 (1988).
48 See Philip P. Frickey, Lawnet: The Case of the Missing (Tenth) Amendment, 75
MINN. L. REv. 755, 755 (1991).
4 9 See George D. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh
Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEo. L.J. 363, 363 (1985).
50 While a hierarchy of interdependence is not a prominent theme of Fallon's project, his
application of conceptual interdependence in four distinct contexts shows that it operates
differently in each, indicating his core recognition of gradations of interdependency. Fallon
works the concept in the contexts of the balancing test, presumptively protected rights, rights
deriving from concerns about powers, and constitutional remedies. See Fallon, supra note 2,
at 360-68.
51 Epstein, supra note 9, at 1397.
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dominant "rights powers" conception of the Ninth Amendment, he illustrates
that certain rights are more explicitly dependent on limited power than others.
He contends, for example, that we cannot glean a right to a speedy and public
trial by jury or freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures simply by
determining what is left over from a limited delegation of powers.52
Inverting his example we can understand that the content and framing of
particular rights-protecting provisions can affect our capacity to contemplate
them in the face of plenary power. Barnett's example offers a model in which
the outcasts differ in important degree from provisions that are more firmly
grounded in values that thrive seemingly independently of a commitment to
limited federal power. For those provisions, firmly grounded in limited-power-
independent values, we nominally can consider the parameters of the right, in
the context of its driving values, without thinking about federal power
boundaries. These nominally limited-power-independent values mask the rights-
eviscerating effect of plenary power.
It is, for example, possible to contemplate the "proper" parameters of the
right to speak freely by focusing on its driving values to construct an image that
fulfills those values. Fallon illustrates the phenomenon in his example of the
distinct interests we can contemplate in defining prohibited child pornography:
"How much speech of how much value is lost under one or another definition
of prohibitable child pornography?" 53 Importantly, the second part of Fallon's
question (What is the speech's value?) is separable and distinct from the first (Is
this speech at all?). The second question-the value of the speech-turns
ultimately on the power side of the equation: "What harms would occur to
which power interests if the value of the speech is deemed to outweigh power
interests?" 54 The fact that we can contemplate the first question separately from
the second-that is the qualification of the phenomenon as nominally protected
speech, apart from the quantitative measure of its speech value and the power
interests necessary to overtake it-shows that we can superficially debate rights
without reference to their underlying dependency on limited power. At a deeper
level the right is still conceptually dependent on substantive power boundaries,
and where they conflict, plenary power always can dissolve the right. But in
many circumstances, the right's foundation in separate and distinct values
permits us to describe it as a substantive protection and submerges the limited-
power-dependency that renders it illusory.55
52 See Randy E. Barnett, James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in 1 RiGms RErAuNED BY
TnI PEoPLE 11 (Randy Barnett ed., 1989) [hereinafter 1 RIGIrrs RErAINED].
53 Fallon, supra note 2, at 373.
541Id.
55 If we conflate the two questions-is it speech and what is its value-the second
question drives us to a rights dissolving inquiry: Is there no set of governmental needs
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In contrast, the outcast provisions are more openly grounded on the
principle of limited federal power. Honest efforts to understand and use them
cannot easily escape a search for federal power boundaries. It is the practical
absence of such boundaries that makes the outcasts so difficult to contemplate.
Here, where conceptual interdependence is hard to submerge, the condition of
the outcast provisions is evidence of a plenary power constitutionalism that
renders rights illusory. 56
1. The Tenth Amendment
The idea of reserved powers embodied in the Tenth Amendment, by its
very formulation, requires serious initial consideration of federal power
boundaries. Modem Tenth Amendment jurisprudence has shown that it has
been extremely difficult to talk about reserved state powers within a framework
of conceptually unlimited federal power.
National League of Cities v. Usery57 was one of the most notable episodes,
since the New Deal, in which the Court tried to frame the parameters of a
sufficient to negate the bar on content based restrictions? In time of national emergency or
panic, would we really protect dissident speech where we believed it threatened our national
survival?
561 am of course attempting to make this case indirectly, by reference to things missing.
Others, proceeding directly, have made similar and broader claims. See, e.g., Alan
Brownstein, How Rights Are lnfringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional
Doctrine, 45 HASrmNGs L.J. 867 (1994) (critiquing governmental power generally). Robin
West summarizes Brownstein's project this way:
The crux of his argument... is that... the fundamental-right, strict-scrutiny formula
that Casey appears to reject has always been something of a mirage. Truth is, we don't
have any fundamental rights not subject to state regulation, and all Casey does, and
entirely to its credit, is give us a workable formula that better fits the reality of what we
do have-rights of varying degrees of importance that can be regulated, limited, or
defined by state action so long as the burdens thereby imposed are not undue. The
jurisprudential importance of Casey, in other words, is that it forces us to a newly
explicit acknowledgment of what in reality is a quite old conception of rights: The
assertion of a right operates not as a trump, but rather as the opening to a regulatory
conversation, in which the collective, or the community, or the society, through the
mechanism of state regulation, defines as well as limits and burdens the content of the
right.
Robin L. West, The Nature of the Right to an Abortion: A Commentary on Professor
Brownstein's Analysis of Casey, 45 HASrNGs L.J. 961, 961-62 (1994).
57 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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substantive Tenth Amendment. 58 Attempting to avoid application of federal
wage and hour guidelines to state workers, the National League of Cities
argued that the Tenth Amendment operated as a "trump" on federal powers, in
the same way, for example, as the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 59 As I have
suggested, a crucial difference is that the values that influence the substance of
provisions like the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are nominally limited-power-
independent.6° A substantive Tenth Amendment in contrast depends at every
stage of consideration upon real federal power boundaries.
The National League majority fashioned the conception of traditional state
functions as a foundation for a substantive Tenth Amendment that evidently
could trump exercises of federal power.61 But the idea confounded lower courts
and the Supreme Court itself.62 There was nothing extraordinarily complex
about the concept. The remarkable thing was the disharmony of reserved state
powers on a practical constitutional canvas of plenary federal power.
It is instructive then, that relatively quickly on the heels of National
League, the Court abandoned the search for protected traditional state functions
as unworkable. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,63 the
majority reflected the concern of lower courts that "[d]espite the abundance of
adjectives, identifying which particular state functions are immune remainsdifclt."164
58 See id. at 842-43 (citing New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 587-88 (1946)
(rejecting the proposition that Congress could impose taxes directly upon states)).
59 See id. at 841.
60 As I have said, this limited-power-independence permits us to surround these
amendments with a superficial rhetoric of respect, even though plenary power is sufficient to
obliterate them where the need is great.
61 See National League, 426 U.S. at 851. The Court said,
These activities are typical of those performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public
services. Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments are created to provide,
services such as these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens. If
Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make those fundamental
employment decisions upon which their systems for performance of these functions must
rest, we think there would be little left of the States' "'separate and independent
existence.'"
Id. (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).62 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 538 (1985)
(providing a list of conflicting cases).
63 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
64 Id. at 538 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 557 F. Supp. 445,
447 (W.D. Tex. 1983)).
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Informed by the conceptual interdependency thesis, this difficulty is easy to
understand. Rejecting "a static historical view of state functions generally
immune from federal regulation," 65 the Court invited a search for reserved
state powers in an environment where solid limits on federal power were, as a
matter of articulated doctrine, nonexistent. The Court's dynamic view of
reserved state functions forced a concession to the reality of plenary federal
power. It is then no surprise that the Garcia majority found "the notion of a
'uniquely' [state] governmental function ... unmanageable." 66 The only thing
more difficult to contemplate is the constellation of powers the Tenth
Amendment reserves to the people themselves. 67
Left then to determine the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment, the Court returned explicitly to what always was the central point:
"They retain those not transferred to the Federal Government." 68 Tending to
confirm the contention that we have no framework for sounding the limits of
that.category, the Court shifted back immediately to the question of explicitly
reserved state powers, to find in Article IV, section 3, a single example of
reserved state powers in the form of state territorial integrity. 69 The Court
moved swiftly from this perfunctory example to construct a procedural model
of state sovereignty. In a move the dissenters argued rendered Congress self-
policing and neutered the Tenth Amendment,70 the majority suggested that the
65 Id. at 540 (quoting Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 686
(1982)).6 6 Id. at 545. The Court of course casts the explanation in different terms. The problem,
it said, is that such a wide array of activities are open to and demanded of states, that it is
difficult to identify those which are traditional or integral. Id. at 546. But the point remains
that our general conventions and practices made it hard to contend that any of this "wide
array" of activities was beyond the scope of federal power.
67 "Those powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
68 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549.
6 9 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
7 0 In dissent, Justice Powell criticized:
Moday's decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric
when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause....
... [Flederal political officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole judges
of the limits of their own power....
... [The majority] does not identify even a single aspect of state authority that
would remain when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal regulation.
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Tenth Amendment is respected primarily by states' participation in the national
legislature and the national political process. 71 Later, in South Carolina v.
Baker,72 the Court pondered whether one of the last kernels of a substantive
Tenth Amendment, a barrier against federal control of the state legislative
process, survived Garcia.73
The nearly closed question contemplated by Baker set the stage for a
meager but illustrative revival of a substantive Tenth Amendment in New York
v. United States.74 The important lesson from New York is the contrast between
the analytical models employed by the majority and the dissent.75 Tracing the
historical advance of the commerce power (and the corresponding decline of
reserved state powers) beyond the model constructed by the framers, the
majority reinfuses substance into the Tenth Amendment by preserving what one
might easily consider among the last items on any list of reserved state
powers-the freedom of state legislators to exercise or refrain from exercising
their power to make state law.
In contrast, the severity of the problem addressed by the suspect legislation
drives Justice White's New York dissent. Summarizing his disagreement with
the majority, White argues that the majority "undervalued the effect that the
seriousness of this public policy problem should have on the constitutionality of
the [legislation].... The imminence of a crisis in low-level radioactive waste
management cannot be overstated." 76 In a model where plenary power is
guided by prevailing preferences and perceptions of necessity, White's
characterization of the problem is virtually dispositive. In a model of solid
power boundaries drawn in a principled way from a power-delineating
document, it is only background.
The difficulty of sustaining National League's conception of a Tenth
Amendment trump value, the Court's quick abandonment of the idea as
unworkable, and the last neutering details addressed in Garcia and Baker,
support the contention that the condition of the Tenth Amendment is explained
by its direct, debilitating conflict with plenary federal power. The appearance of
469 U.S. at 560, 567, 579 (Powell, J., dissenting).
71 See id. at 550-52. Had the Court solidified that position it would have been
unnecessary to discuss the Tenth Amendment again, except in remarkable cases where a
state's representatives were somehow obstructed from participating in federal legislative
decisions.
72 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
73 See id. at 513.
74 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
75 Compare id. at 149-88 (majority) with id. at 188-210 (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
76 Id. at 190 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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New York v. United States and United States v. Lopez77 requires separate
reconciliation that I will undertake in Part Ill.B. Pending that reconciliation, the
recent condition of the Tenth Amendment can be understood as* a result of its
frontal conflict with plenary federal power.
2. The Ninth Amendment
There is little controversy over the origins of the Ninth Amendment. 78 We
know that it evolved in the context of concerns that explicit enumeration of
rights was redundant, since rights were protected by a narrowly circumscribed
delegation of federal powers. We also know that the precise impulse prompting
it was a fear that enumeration of certain rights would lead to the inference that
the vast array of rights left unimpaired by the limited delegation of federal
power had been replaced with the scant few that became the Bill of Rights.79
77 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
78 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions: Of Real and Unreal
Differences, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 95, 101 (1987) ("It is generally recognized that
the Ninth Amendment was proposed by James Madison in response to fears that a specific
enumeration of rights in the form of a Bill of Rights might someday be interpreted so as to
defeat or belittle rights not included in such an enumeration.").
79 Richard Epstein comments, "Hamilton treated jurisdiction as a more effective
guarantor of individual rights than a bill of rights, because he believed that it provided clear
and powerful lines to keep government from straying beyond its appointed limits." Epstein,
supra note 9, at 1390. Hamilton had written:
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights ... are not only unnecessary in the proposed
Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to
powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim
more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no
power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be
restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?
Id. at 1390 n.7 (quoting THE FEDERAusT No. 84, at 559 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem
College Library ed., 1937)). Suzanna Sherry notes,
Eighteenth century Americans passionately believed that their most important liberties
came not from written bills of figts .... James Iredell told the North Carolina
ratifying convention[:] "It would be not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a
number of rights which are not intended to be given up; because it would be implying, in
the strongest manner, that every right not included in the exception might be impaired by
the government without usurpation."... Madison eventually solved the problem by
including the Ninth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.
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The controversy emerges instead as we try to conceive the Ninth
Amendment's operational role in modem America.80 The Ninth Amendment's
confirmation of a constellation of rights existing outside the boundaries of
enumerated federal powers is critically dependent upon the conviction that
boundaries on federal power in fact exist. Plenary power dissolves those
boundaries.
Speculating on the absence of Ninth Amendment jurisprudence, Knowlton
Kelsey suggested that unenumerated Ninth Amendment rights "may have been
extinguished by long acquiescence of the people in legislative extension of
federal power or by judicial decisions on the extent of power." 81 Randy Barnett
states matter-of-factly that the Ninth Amendment has floundered in the wake of
a rights-powers conception of it, which identifies Ninth Amendment rights as
the residual or negative image of federal power.82 In a plenary power
environment this dominant rights-powers conception is confounded by
conceptual interdependence. 83
Suzanna Sherry, supra note 42, at 62, 65; see also infra note 83, for a summary of the Ninth
Amendment roots described in Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
80 See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Suzanna and-the Ninth Amendment, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REv.
51 (1994). According to Berger,
Suzana Sherry pronounces that the "debate over the meaning of the ninth amendment is
essentially over .... [A]Il but one contributor [to a recent symposium] agreed that the
ninth amendment does protect judicially enforceable unenumerated rights." Sherry is
long on assertion but short on facts. A fellow symposiast, Andrzej Rapaczynski, wrote
that "for every interpretation that sees the [Ninth Amendment] as support for judicial
activism there is another, respectable one, that does not."
Id. at 51 (quoting Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten
Constitution, 64 CM.-KENt L. REv. 1001 (1988), reprinted in 2 THE RiGHTS RErAmED BY
Tim PEOPLE 283, 283 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993) [hereinafter 2 RIGmS RrAIm] and
Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution, 64 Cm.-KENT
L. REv. 177 (1988), reprinted in 2 RiGHTS RErAmED, at 163, 163).
81 Knowlton H. Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J.
309, 320 (1936).
82 See Barnett, supra note 52, at 6. Thomas McAffee labels Ninth Amendment rights
under the rights-power conception "residual rights." See Thomas B. McAffee, The Original
Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1215, 1220 (1990).
83 It is, however, challenging to square the rights-power construction of the Ninth
Amendment with a subsequent constitutional history in which the Bill of Rights have been at
least partially incorporated as limitations on states. How would the Ninth Amendment, so
interpreted, be incorporated? Very clearly the original scope of state powers exceeded that of
the federal government. Construing incorporated Ninth Amendment rights as the residual of
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On the rights-powers view of it, the Ninth Amendment resists the cloak of
rhetorical respect because (like the Tenth Amendment) it clashes frontally with
plenary power and lacks independent foundational values that nominally would
detach Ninth Amendment rights from limited-power-dependency. As I have
said, such limited-power-independent values and the protections grounded on
them are, when pressed, no constraint on plenary power. But they are a
necessary component of the rhetoric that sustains rights in fair weather.
There have been, however, notable scholarly efforts to establish an
independent-values foundation on which to construct Ninth Amendment
narrowly circumscribed federal power translates into a barrier on federal police powers but
should not similarly restrain states. Either the Ninth Amendment is not amenable to
incorporation, or its incorporation would require identification of certain fundamental
unenumerated rights that states could not infringe. The question is whether such rights
properly would be considered a subset (at least partially) of inverted-power Ninth Amendment
rights.
Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
engages both the rights-power view of the Ninth Amendment and a fundamental rights view.
Arguably Goldberg's "fundamental" Ninth Amendment rights are properly a subset of
originally conceived residual Ninth Amendment rights. If they are, then the notion of two
spheres of Ninth Amendment rights might not diminish the conceptual interdependence
critique. The absence of federal power limitations from which to draw operating negative
image rights (which subsume findamental rights that also restrain the states) might remain a
dramatic barrier to invigorating the Ninth Amendment.
Considering the Court's efforts to date in drawing unenumerated penumbral rights from
other parts of the text, it is difficult to say the Court has trespassed upon some obvious textual
delegation of power. If considered in the context of a similar federal intrusion, the penumbral
right to privacy or association might just as fairly have emerged from a finding that there was
no federal power to intrude into those matters. At least so far, it is possible to say that the
fundamental unenumerated rights discovered by the court fit within a notion of residual Ninth
Amendment rights-that is, a traditionally understood commerce power (as conceived, for
example, by Epstein, supra note 9) would reach them only after tremendous difficulty. It
remains plausible then to conceive of fundamental Ninth Amendment rights as a subset of
residual rights. This view sustains the utility of the conceptual interdependence critique with
respect to the Ninth Amendment.
Indeed, even scholarly efforts that would ground Ninth Amendment rights in natural law
-conceptions of individual liberty seem compelled to consider the expressly delegated powers
of the federal government as a limitation on those pre-existing rights. See, e.g., BEN=arr B.
PATrnSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT, excerpted in 1 RiGHTS RErAuNED, supra
note 52, at 107-08. At the outset, Patterson, while contending that the Ninth Amendment
recognizes rather than creates "individual sovereignty in the realm of natural and inherent
rights," confronts the reality that the Framers' "theory of the Constitution was that it was only
a body of powers which were granted to the government." Id. This statement acknowledges,
if only indirectly, the legitimacy of restraints on those pre-existing rights within the
boundaries of delegated powers.
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rights. 84 But the absence of explicit textual support for these limited-power-
independent values leaves some of the more aggressive efforts open to the
criticism that they grow merely from the political preferences of their
advocates. 85
A less dramatic construction of limited-power-independent Ninth
Amendment rights appears in the concurrence by Justice Goldberg in Griswold
v. Connecticut.86 Through his discussion of origins and history of the Ninth
Amendment, Justice Goldberg indicates that Ninth Amendment rights are
constituted, at least in part, of the negative image of federal power.87 But he
also suggests that the Ninth Amendment confirms a realm of fundamental
individual rights that limit state action as well. 88
Ultimately Goldberg conceives the Ninth Amendment's independent-rights-
value as less purely substantive and more a rule of construction for the
Constitution-an affirmation of the Court's development of unenumerated
penumbral rights from explicit textual protections. While more modest in its
consequences than many, this approach is in the same general vein as scholarly
efforts to enliven the Ninth Amendment with limited-power-independent
values. 8 9
This type of approach, animating the Ninth Amendment with nominally
84 See, e.g., 1 RIGHTS R~rAINED, supra note 52; 2 RIGHTS RErAINED, supra note 80
(compiling an array of scholarly treatments of the Ninth Amendment).
85 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 80, at 59-61. Berger criticizes Suzanna Sherry's
argument for an enlivened Ninth Amendment, calling it "a fancy way of saying that a judge is
free to substitute whatever meaning he chooses.... Implicit in Sherry's fancy theorizing and
that of her fellows is a confession of failure to obtain from the people the measures they
desire." Id.
86 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
87 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 80. In his concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut,
Justice Goldberg recounts Justice Story's Commentaries, which invite the rights-powers
construction of the Ninth Amendment:
In regard to... [a] suggestion that the affirmance of certain rights might disparage
others, or might lead to argumentative implications in favor of other powers, it
might be sufficient to say that such a course of reasoning could never be sustained
upon any solid basis.... But a conclusive answer is that such attempt may be
interdicted (as it has been) by a positive declaration in [the Ninth Amendment].
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting 2 JoSEPH STORY,
ComMaENARiEs ON THE CONs'rrruIoN OF THE UNITED STATES 626, 627 (5th ed. 1891)).
Arguably, modem America has witnessed the expansion of power Story urges could never be
sustained.
88 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492-93.
89 See, e.g., 1 RiGHTs RETAINED, supra note 52; 2 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 80.
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independent rights values, might allow Ninth Amendment jurisprudence to
develop even in the face of conceptually unlimited federal power. This
developing jurisprudence might remove the Ninth Amendment from the group
of outcasts, simply by eliminating its status as an indicator of plenary federal
power, without any accompanying commitment by the Court to take limited
power seriously. 90
In the meantime, Randy Barnett's assessment is apt: the dominant rights-
powers conception of the Ninth Amendment explains its status. So long as this
view dominates our understanding of the Ninth Amendment, plenary federal
power will render the Ninth Amendment an outcast from the Bill of Rights.91
90 See Barnett, supra note 52, at 6. Barnett contends the rights/powers view is wrong, in
part because it is partly responsible for the long-standing neglect of the Ninth Amendment.
Barnett brushes against Fallon's conceptual interdependence thesis in his contention that the
rights-powers conception renders the Ninth Amendment inapplicable to "any conceivable case
or controversy. On the assumption that rights and powers are logically
complementary.... the focus... is entirely on the powers side... and the language of the
Tenth Amendment." Id. at 8. Barnett fails, however, to incorporate the enumerated powers
component of this equation. The decisive inquiry into power limits should focus on the
Commerce Clause, not the Tenth Amendment. Expansive interpretation of the Commerce
Clause confounds both the Ninth and the Tenth Amendments. That these two provisions share
a dependency on a principled interpretation of the Commerce Clause is core to their
significance as outcasts. Understood this way, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are similarly
afflicted. But contrary to Barnett's critique, their common relationship to the question of
federal power boundaries does not render the Ninth Amendment superfluous.
91 See id at 6. As an introduction to his criticism of it, Barnett illustrates why the rights-
powers view has continuing appeal:
The rights-powers conception of the Ninth Amendment views delegated powers and
constitutional rights as logically complementary. This approach has two important
advantages. First, when rights are viewed as the logical obverse of powers, content
can be given to unenumerated rights by exclusively focusing on the express
provisions delegating powers. By avoiding the need to directly address the substance
of unenumerated rights, the rights-powers conception appears to provide judges
with a practical way of interpreting the otherwise open-ended Ninth Amendment.
Second, the view that rights and powers are logically complementary seems to
avoid any internal conflict or logical contradiction between constitutional rights and
powers. In this way the rights-powers conception has the apparent virtue of treating
the Constitution as internally coherent.
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3. The Second Amendment
The Second Amendment is semantically closest to other provisions of the
Bill of Rights whose language grounds them in values that are nominally
limited-power-independent. Indeed, its arguable dual purpose (an affirmation of
individual self-defense and a check on abuse of power) offers individual self-
defense as a solidly independent rights-value with the capacity to submerge the
Second Amendment's limited-power-dependency, thus pushing us to understand
its outcast status as something other than a consequence of a frontal conflict
with plenary power. And similar to the Ninth Amendment, there has been a
great deal of scholarship expounding on that independent rights-value. 92
The meager efforts of the Court stand in stark contrast. Measured by the
Court's single treatment of the Second Amendment in this century,93 United
States v. Miller,94 the Second Amendment is directly and critically dependent
on the concept of limited federal powers. Miller reached the Court from a
decision dismissing the prosecution of the defendant for transporting a short-
barreled shotgun, in violation of the National Firearms Act of 1934, on the
grounds that the Act violated the Second Amendment. The Court reversed and
remanded "in the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or
use of a [short-barreled shotgun] has some reasonable relationship to the
92 Overwhelmingly this scholarship finds both the Second Amendment's power limiting
value and its affirmation of individual self-defense readily apparent and systematically
important. See, e.g., JoYcE LEE MALcoLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMs, 162-63 (1994); see
also Nicholas J. Johnson, Shots Across No Man's Land: A Response to Handgun Control,
Inc. 's, Richard Aborn, 22 FORDHAM URi. L.J. 441, 449 n.23 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson,
Szots] (listing the numerous projects supporting the individual rights view); Nicholas J.
Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed Through the
Ninth Amendment, 24 RuTGERs L.J. 1, 1 (1992) [hereinafter Johnson, Beyond the Second
Amendment] (same).
93 Another opportunity certainly presented itself in Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d
261 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding local ban on possession of handguns).
94 307 U.S. 174 (1939). Since the framing, the Court has heard only two other cases
significantly related to the Second Amendment, United States v. Crukshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1875), and Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). Cndkshank involved a suit by federal
authorities against Cruikshank for violating the rights of two black men by interfering with
their right to bear arms. The Court held that the federal government had no power to protect
citizens against private action that deprived them of their constitutional rights, and that the
Second Amendment was a limitation on Congress, not on private individuals. See Cruikshank,
92 U.S. at 542. In Presser, the Court concluded that a state statute limiting the bearing of
arms was not a violation of the Second Amendment because the amendment was not a
limitation on state governments. This decision was prior to the incorporation of any of the Bill
of Rights as limitations on states. See Presser, 116 U.S. at 267.
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preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia." 95 This language is one
impulse for the view that the Second Amendment does not protect individual
firearms ownership. 96 However, Miller's verification that "the Militia
comprises all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common
defense [and] expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of
the kind in common usage at the time" is a staple of the individual rights
interpretation. 97 But on either view of it, Miller arguably still positions the
95 Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
96 It is difficult to pinpoint the emergence of this view of the Second Amendment.
However, as Professor Van Aistyne notes, if the states' rights conception of the Second
Amendment is accurate, it was one of the best kept secrets of the eighteenth century, "for no
known writing surviving from the period between 1787 and 1791 states such a thesis." Van
Alstyne, supra note 43, at 1243 n.19 (quoting with approval STEPHEN P. HAI ROOK, THAT
EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EvoLroN OF A CONsrUONAL RIGHT 83 (1984)). While
others would place it later, Professor Cottrol positions the emergence of the states' rights view
more than a century after the framing of the Second Amendment, around the end of the
nineteenth century. See Robert J. Cottrol, The Second Amendment: Invitation to a Multi-
Dimension Debate, in GUN CONTROL AND THE CONsrrurnON xxvi (Robert J. Cottrol ed.,
1994). Don Kates contends the states' rights view did not appear until this century. See Don
B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82
MicH. L. REv. 204, 244-45 (1983). Among scholars who have actually done work in the
area, the states' rights construction of the Amendment has been overwhelmingly dismissed.
For a recent list of the scholarship pro and con see Johnson, Shots, supra note 92, at 449
n.23. For the best current opposition to the individual rights view see Gary Wills, To Keep
and Bear Arns, NEw YORKREvIEw OF BOOKS, Sept. 27, 1995, at 62.
97 Miller, 307 U.S. at 179. The Court draws this construction of the militia from "the
debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings
of approved commentators." Id. at 179. Notably, the commentaries of Justice Story (invoked
with approval in Justice Goldberg's exploration of the Ninth Amendment in Griswold) present
a similar, arguably ambiguous, construction of the Second Amendment. In 1833 Justice Story
wrote:
The militia is the natural defence of a free country against sudden foreign invasions,
domestic insurrections, and domestic usurpations of power by rulers .... The right
of the citizens to keep, and bear arms has justly been considered, as the palladium of the
liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and
arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first
instance, enable the people to resist, and triumph over them. And yet, though this truth
would seem so clear, and the importance of a well regulated militia would seem so
undeniable, it cannot be disguised, that among the American people there is a growing
indifference to any systemof militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from a sense of
its burthens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to keep the people duly
armed without some organization, it is difficult to see. There is certainly no small
danger, that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus gradually
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Second Amendment in terms of its collective, power-limiting value. Focusing
on this value casts the Second Amendment as a vital political control-a
perhaps impractical or unpalatable, but finally physical, barrier to abusive
assertions of power.
There is a frontal and pervasive conflict between plenary power
constitutionalism and the concept of a citizens' militia ready to bear arms (either
those supplied by their state or their own private arms) as a barrier to abuse of
federal power. Thus framed, the Second, like the Ninth and the Tenth
undermine all the protection intended by this clause of our national bill of rights.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNsu= ON OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) quoted
in Robert J. Cottrol, supra note 96, at xxxvi.
Numerous studies have described the Framers' clear distinction between the militia-
consisting of all the people bearing their private arms-on the one hand, and government
armed and controlled "select militias" and standing armies on the other. The latter two
represent precisely the danger that the militia was intended to oppose. See, e.g., Cottrol,
supra note 96, at xxxvii. The value of the militia is its detachment from the state, its
foundation in "the people." Today of course, in many venues, this concept is as odd as the
Tenth Amendment's declaration of a sphere of power reserved explicitly to "the people."
That such notions are so difficult to contemplate is another reflection of the plenary power
structure's departure from the originally contemplated dispersal of power.
In a critique unrelated to constitutional or legal issues, social ecologist Murry Bookchin
discusses the connection between an empowered citizenry and the capacity to use force. See
MURRY BOOKcHIN, THE RISE OF URBANIZATION AND THE DECuNE OF CTzENsHIP 284-85
(1987). Considered in the constitutional context, this observation underscores the evident
connection between what has become the unfathomable power reserved to the people by the
Tenth Amendment and the inconceivable militia of the whole described by the Second
Amendment:
Power must be conceived as real, indeed solid and tangible, not only as spiritual and
psychological. To ignore the fact that power is a muscular fact of life is to drift from the
visionary into the ethereal and mislead the public as to its crucial significance in affecting
society's destiny. What this means is that if power is to be regained by the people from
the state, management of society must be deprofessionalized as much as possible. That is
to say, it must be simplified and rendered transparent, indeed, clear, accessible, and
manageable such that most of its affairs can be run by ordinary citizens.
Power is also a solid and tangible fact to be reckoned with militarily, notably in the
ubiquitous truth that the power of the state or of the people eventually reposes in force.
Whether or not the state has power depends upon whether the state exercises a monopoly
of violence. By the same token, whether or not the people have power depends upon
whether or not it is armed and creates its own grass roots militia, not only to guard itself
from criminals or invaders but also from the ever encroaching power of the state itself.
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Amendments, is facially dependent on principled federal power boundaries. 98
Absent a serious commitment to those boundaries, it is difficult to visualize
ultra vires federal action justifying widespread violent resistance, or even to
determine a direction in which to search for the abuse of power that the militia
is supposed to resist.99 The idea is so confounding as to be trivialized 1°° and
discarded-essentially the status in which the Second Amendment now sits
among many 101 in the legal academy, at the bar, and elsewhere. 102
98 It is intriguing to consider that, from a rights perspective, we might have been better
off without a Bill of Rights. Absent the false security of these enumerated rights, would we
have been so informal about the expansion of powers?
99 It is difficult to say that the types of affronts that prompted our revolutionary war
qualify. Indeed, contemporary complaints of the residents of the District of Columbia about
taxation without representation seem almost quaint.
100The failure of states' rights advocates to engage the implications of the states' rights
view trivializes the Second Amendment. But more than that, it invites the charge that the
states' rights view is only a perfunctory attempt to construct an explanation that avoids the
individual rights construction. Serious evaluation of the states' rights construction raises
extremely troublesome questions that advocates of the position have not discussed-e.g., state
acquisition of and preparations with artillery, air power, and weapons of heavy destruction
whose control is concentrated in a handful of state officials. This might pose a much more
dangerous systemic threat than individual citizens whose collective violent impulse we should
expect will be triggered only by very severe abuse. Moreover, taken seriously, the position
appears to be inconsistent with Article I of the constitution, allowing states to repeal all
federal gun controls within their borders. See Don B. Kates & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The
Second Amendment and States' Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1737, 1742 (1995).
101 Assuming a prevailing constitutionalism devoid of real federal power boundaries, it
is easier to understand contributions like the report of the bar association of the city of New
York, declaring that the individual rights reading of the Second Amendment has no
constitutional basis. See Committee on Fed. Legislation of the N.Y. City Bar Ass'n., Federal
Gun Control and the Second Amendment, 48 REcORD 997 (1993) [hereinafter Federal Gun
Contro!]. Such a view, says the report, is illogical: "[Tihe Constitution's initial purpose was
to create government, and it would have been irrational to provide, in the same document, a
legal means for its armed destruction." Id. at 995. Professor Van Alstyne emphasizes that the
language of the Second Amendment refers to the preservation of a free state, not the
preservation of the state, although there are regimes that do enjoy such protection. See supra
note 43, at 1244. The New York City bar report misses this distinction.
102 However, its absence in the framework of serious constitutional thought leaves a
gaping hole. George Washington is reputed to have said, "Politics is not eloquence or reason,
it is force." H.L. MENcKEN, PREJnmis 221 (2d ser. 1924), quoted in JAMES BOVARD,
LosT RloIrrs 1 (1994). Absent a counterbalancing capacity for violence in the people, we
must depend on process or faith that the enormous power reposed in Washington will be
exercised with restraint. For many Americans, such faith would be foolhardy.
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4. Reflections on the Outcasts
My linkage of the outcast provisions is not, of course, definitive proof of a
dominant plenary power constitutionalism that renders all rights illusory.103
Absent the triggering exigencies that I contend are the only barriers to rights-
dissolving exercises of plenary power, it is difficult to demonstrate directly the
fair-weather nature of the rights we claim to hold dear. But a basic socratic
escalation of the stakes pushes the contention another step forward. If to save
the republic we must sacrifice the [insert your favorite here] Amendment, will
-we do it? Conversely, is there any principle or value, constitutional or
otherwise, for which comfortable, rich Americans will sacrifice the order and
103 Do the unique histories of the outcast provisions bar the linkages I have described?
The decline of the Tenth Amendment is readily linked to the elevation of federal power, but
there simply never has been an active Second or Ninth Amendment jurisprudence. Perhaps
they just never have come up? Plainly though, the question of unenumerated rights has been
one of the burning issues of our generation. The controversy surrounding the right to abortion
is the keenest example.
Given the radically different views about the meaning of the Second Amendment and its
intersection with various crime control formulae, it is hard to say it has not come up. I have
argued elsewhere that the fight over the constitutional status of individual arms is the greatest
barrier to building consensus on gun regulation. See Johnson, Shots, supra note 92. Political
reactions against gun regulation that is considered a general threat to gun ownership arguably
put the entire liberal agenda at risk. Departing Representative Anthony Beilenson (D. Cal.), a
champion of liberal causes who was targeted by the GOP because of his "unswerving loyalty
to President Clinton," puts it this way:
I happen to be for reasonable gun control. But we unnecessarily lost good Democratic
members because of their votes on the Brady bill and semiautomatic assault weapon ban.
I am glad we passed them, but they will have but a modest effect out there in the real
world. It was not worth it at all. Why lose 15 good members because they cast a good
vote on gun control, which made a modest difference, but their loss made a huge
difference?
We lost control of the place, so great damage can be done to seniors, to the
environment, to Medicaid because these folks cast principled, good votes on gun control.
It wasn't worth it. It's a terrible thing to say, but it's the truth. I don't want any more of
our fine colleagues to be sacrificed on the altar of gun control.
Greg Pierce, Inside Politics, WAsH. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, at A6 (quoting E. Michael
Myers's interview with Anthony Beilenson); see also Evelyn Theiss, Clinton Blames Losses
on NRA, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 14, 1995, at Al ("The fight for the assault-weapons ban cost




structure on which their comfort depends?1°4
Perhaps it is not mere coincidence that the outcasts languish together on the
constitutional ash-heap. Their condition may in fact be explained by their
peculiar incompatibility with plenary federal power. 105 It is significant then that
we have not been more concerned that these provisions have come to mean
nothing in modem America. 1°6 That we are so untroubled by their condition
104 While I have endeavored to make this case by inference from what is missing, others
have argued explicitly that rights rhetoric is illusory, even in connection with provisions we
purport to take seriously. The most vigorous attack comes from the critical legal studies
movement. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393, 393
(1988) (arguing from a CLS perspective that rights rhetoric is illusory and dangerous); Mark
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 "I'x. L. REv. 1363, 1363 (1984); see also Friedman, supra
note 21, at 447 ("Evidently, there is hardly any 'trump' in the right to be free from an
unreasonable seizure."). Ronald Dworkin argues that utilitarian and other consequentialist
theories aiming to achieve the "best" results fail to take rights seriously. See DwoRKmN, supra
note 23, at ix-xv.
105 'Me condition of the outcasts also has implications for the most notable validation of
the revolutionary elevation of federal power wrought by the New Deal-B.ruce Ackerman's
structural amendment project. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in RESPONDiNG
TO IMPE CInON 63-87 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); BRUCE A. AcKRmuAN, WE TBE
PEOPLE: FOUNDAnONS (1991).
Professor Fallon observes, "Today, historical limits on the scope of federal powers are
generally viewed as anachronisms." Fallon, supra note 2, at 349. The expansion of federal
power that Ackerman tries to validate pushes us to say the same thing about the outcast
provisions. But their continuation in the text and the discord surrounding them underscores a
difficulty with structural amendment. It leaves in its wake provisions of the Bill of Rights that
one must suppose have been stricken simply by implication. That is an informality of process
that invites severe cultural convulsions as factions fight about whether and when things that
remain in the text were really eliminated, and when things that are not in the text became
guiding principles. The worst part is that only the constitutional priesthood can even approach
such questions, making our guiding public document even less accessible to ordinary people.
106 It may be useful to view these provisions with the recognition that, in the
marketplace of ideas, our evaluations depend as much on the presence, power, and resources
of the speaker, as the merits of the ideas. We have seen this phenomenon working in two
contexts. In the abortion debate, the silent and invisible fetus loses what would be a slam dunk
if we had to face her. We watched this play out as well in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial.
The victims were absent. Their interests were diminished by the defendant who had a
dominant, persistent voice and presence.
Pending the framing of our constitution, the federal government had no significant voice.
It was unknown and feared. Currently, through accumulation of power, the federal
government has the largest voice in the polity. Our perspective on it and the proper scope of
its power are affected by that voice. That voice is in a position diametrically opposite where it
began-a shift that contributes to our discovery of mysteries in the provisions that aimed
initially to restrain this voiceless suspect.
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may be evidence of an attachment to plenary federal power that cuts across
ideological lines.107 1 examine that possibility next.
B. Gauging Lopez
In 1987 Richard Epstein pondered whether his harsh critique of the modem
expansive construction of the Commerce Clause was "idle theoretical
speculation or [of] profound practical importance."10 8 However it may appear,
United States. v. Lopez'09 does not answer his question. While Lopez has
crashed into the pilings of the elevated Commerce Clause, the results of the
collision remain unclear." 0 As Justice Souter contends, Lopez seems
"hardly... epochal.""'l But Souter adds, "Not every epochal case has come
in epochal trappings. Jones and Laughlin did not reject the direct-indirect
[connection to interstate commerce] standard in so many words.... But we
know what happened." 112
Ultimately, Lopez might merely join Gregory v. Ashcroft" 3 and New York
v. United States114 as another cog in a limited and unremarkable ascension of
the Tenth Amendment-a mildly dramatic declaration that police powers are
107 Sheldon Wolin identifies something similar in an interview with Bill Moyers:
Moyers: [C]onservatism used to be defined by a fear, if not a loathing of government.
Now conservatives make reference to the state, and talk at times of President Reagan
almost as if he were a sovereign, in the same way the tories used to talk about George
ml.
Wolin: It's unfortunately not just conservatives. The so called neo-liberals also have an
expanded view of the state. We fight over deregulation or regulation, or this policy or
that policy, but we don't talk about the question of state power itself.
BiLL MOYERS, A WORLD OF IDEAS: CONVERSATIONS WITH THOUGHTFUL MEN AND WoiEN
ABouT AMERICAN LIFE TODAY AND THE IDEAs SHAPING OUR FuruR 98 (1989).
108 Epstein, supra note 9, at 1388 (criticizing the dominant modem view of the
Commerce Clause as "wrong and clearly so").
109 115 S. CL 1624 (1995).
110 See supra text accompanying note 16.
111Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1657 (Souter, J., dissenting).
112 Id. Justice Souter refers to Jones v. Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and
notes that "[t]he Court's finding that the regulated activity had a direct enough effect on
commerce has since been seen as beginning the abandonment, for practical purposes, of the
formalistic distinction between direct and indirect effects." Id.
113 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
114 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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reserved to the states. On the other hand, it might signal a new era of principled
limitations on federal power. One measure of Lopez's effect will be the Court's
treatment of the other two provisions that have been conceptually exiled by an
omnipotent Commerce Clause.
Fallon contends that both liberals and conservatives have embraced
expanded federal power. 115 Bruce Ackerman observes that conservative
Supreme Court Justices typically join liberals in favoring broad interpretations
of the government's power. 116 Laurence Tribe has argued that the
conservatives on the Court enthusiastically embrace the Tenth Amendment as a
principle demanding limitations on federal power, but incongruously are
reluctant to deal generously with the Ninth Amendment's promise of
unenumerated rights and corresponding limits on power. 117
As I have said, from a majoritarian perspective, conceptually unlimited
power may be attractive. 118 Those Americans relatively secure in their access
to collective power might view centuries-old limitations on their capacity to
solve problems or to gratify dominant collective preferences to be a foolishly
rigid vestige of the past. For mainstream players the only real question may be
whether the prevailing agenda for utilizing conceptually unlimited power is in
its optimum configuration-that is, have the paths of prudence and necessity
been optimally cut.
Viewed cynically, the recent ascension of the Tenth Amendment is merely
a rightward spin on this phenomenon-pushing toward a conservative
configuration of plenary power constitutionalism and yielding something far
less than a principled power-limiting structure. A signal that it is something
more-that it is a movement toward principled limitations on federal power-
may be the Court's subsequent treatment of the Ninth and Second
Amendments.
If the Court truly has restored the principle of limited federal power to
modern constitutionalism, then it has a mechanism with which to begin charting
the sea of rights that, according to the rights/powers view of the Ninth
Amendment, surrounds islands of federal power. Indeed, we might expect the
Court's treatment of the Ninth Amendment to be the most dramatic indicator,
since opposition to an enlivened Ninth Amendment breaks more cleanly along
115 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 349-50.
116 See Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstractions, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 317, 317-19
(1992); see also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 545 (1975) (affirming Richard Nixon's
wage and price controls as an admittedly intrusive but temporary enactment tailored to combat
a national emergency).
117 See generally Tribe, supra note 78.
118 See supra Part Il and infra Part IV.
19961
OHIO STATE LAW JOURVAL
liberal and conservative lines.1 19
However, as I indicated earlier, if Ninth Amendment rights are animated
by a fundamental rights analysis, rather than a residual rights analysis, the
Ninth Amendment will cease to be an indicator of the scope of federal power.
Moreover, depending on the timing, a burgeoning Ninth Amendment
jurisprudence might falsely indicate the revival of principled limits on federal
power. If the political configuration of the Court shifts, an enlivened Ninth
Amendment might emerge from a liberal majority's cynical exploitation of an
unprincipled "limited power" foundation that conservatives set with the aim of
optimizing, through revitalization of the Tenth Amendment, the plenary power
constitutional structure. A Ninth Amendment jurisprudence then could emerge
consistent with a continuing attachment (now liberal) to plenary federal power
exercised the "correct" way.
The status of the Second Amendment, then, is one120 remaining barometer
of the vitality of the plenary power model and perhaps a better indicator of a
principled revival of the constitution's power-limiting principles. The Second
Amendment is the bane of brahmans on both the left and the right.121 It is
arguably one of the most socially expensive of the explicit guarantees. If,
despite these handicaps, the Second Amendment is lifted by the wave of Lopez,
it may signal a commitment to principled limits on federal power that seems
essential to taldng rights seriously. 122
119 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 80 (arguing his liberal credentials in spite of the
popular contention that opponents of an enlivened Ninth Amendment are primarily neo-
conservatives).
120 There may be others.
121 Jeffery Snyder contends that, "[iun addition to being enamored of the power of
words, our conservative elite shares with liberals the notion that an armed society is just not
civilized or progressive, that massive gun ownership is a blot on our civilization." Jeffery R.
Snyder, A Nation of Cowards, 113 PuB. INTaER 40, 40 (1993).
It is interesting to compare the shifting preferences of British elites. Joyce Malcolm
recounts the English aristocracy's choice of an armed populace as a check on the power of the
crown. In England, as internal political battles came more to be fought with economic and
communications weapons, an armed populace no longer served political elites, and the right in
England was gently teased away. See MALCOLM, supra note 92, at 165-77.
122 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the importance of cultural fidelity to constitutional
power boundaries); see also Van Alstyne, supra note 43, at 1254.
[The difference between] serious people who are willing to confront serious problems in
regulating "the right to keep and bear arms" ... and others... is that such serious
people begin with a constitutional understanding that declines to trivialize the Second
Amendment... or any other right expressly identified elsewhere in the Bill of Rights.
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Marginal shifts in the mood of the majority are to be expected. Mainstream
players might be quite happy to live within a model of plenary federal power,
even during periods in which certain of their preferences are out of favor. If the
Court's recent power-limiting rhetoric merely elevates the Tenth Amendment, it
can be viewed as an illustration of this phenomenon-a predictable and
unremarkable conservative adjustment of the plenary power structure. If the
Court's power-limiting rhetoric prompts serious treatment of the embarrassing
Second and the forgotten Ninth Amendments, then we might fairly consider
Lopez to have genuinely prefigured a principled power-limiting
constitutionalism.
IV. THE PARADOX OF PLENARY PowER: A CRrTICAL RACE ANALYSIS
AND A CRITIQUE OF VOICE
The majoritarian impulse to throw off conceptual restraints on collective
power is understandable. Such restraints imply that we cannot trust ourselves to
make prudent, sensible collective decisions-a contention that majority players
might understandably reject. But for American minorities, distrust of
unrestrained collective decisions, the danger of being on the ugly end of those
decisions, resonates deeply. As a model for the future, plenary power
constitutionalism offers nothing inherently attractive to minorities. Minorities
must simply gamble on the direction of the majoritarian currents that drive it.
Brown people must acknowledge, of course, that roughly herded collective
power grounds the vital statutory protections of the civil rights era. But if the
mood of the majority shifts in a way that sends the fortunes of minorities into
decline, the exercise of plenary power will be tethered to that shift. And we
may be very troubled by the array of problems and necessities that this shift
demands be addressed by the enormous power sited in Washington. This Part
explores that paradox.
This Part has a second ambition that emerges concurrently. As I evaluate
the paradox of plenary power, I engage orthodox race positions as well as ideas
that run contrary to traditional views of minority interests. As I show, both
critiques operate solidly within voice of color. 123 These critiques prompt
consideration of the capacity of voice to drive doctrinal and other choices which
I pursue in Part IV.C.
Part IV.A presents the unorthodox case, grounded in outsider perspectives,
Id.
123 As noted earlier, I appreciate but ultimately reject Jerome Culp's distinction between
voice of color and black perspective. See Culp, supra note 7. My use of the term "voice" in
this part also will encompass Culp's formulation of "black perspective."
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for rejecting the plenary power model. Part IV.B is a more traditional
evaluation concluding that the consequence for brown people of abandoning the
plenary power model is a disqualifying danger. Part IV.C engages the question
of voice utility raised by these conflicting outsider critiques. It argues that voice
cannot dictate conclusions but remains valuable for the nontraditional paths it
cuts through considerations of doctrine and policy.
A. Wrestling with Plenary Power
American minorities might view plenary power constitutionalism as close to
the worst of circumstances. If the severity of the problem, as perceived by the
majority, is the practical source of federal power to address the problem, 124
then "rights" become merely rhetorical balms that soothe us in fair weather.
This leaves minorities ensnared by the illusion of rights125 and exposed to
unrestrained exercises of majority power in the foul weather where we need
rights most. But is this danger substantial enough and concrete enough to push
minority allegiances away from the plenary power model and toward a more
formalist constitutionalism126-a rendition (arguably unprincipled) of which
many who have been open political enemies of brown people are currently
associated?
Ultimately, even a serious power constraining constitutionalism may be
nothing but a "parchment barrier"' 127 to majoritarian excesses-a barrier just as
illusory as the rights rhetoric I have criticized. As James Fleming has
expressed:
"American constitutional interpretation takes for granted the elemental
124 See supra Part II; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text on Justice White's
dissent in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
125 See generally Derrick Bell, Jr., A Holiday for Dr. King, The Significance of Symbols
in the Black Freedom Struggle, 17 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 433 (1984) (suggesting that many
laws purporting to advance minority rights are merely symbolic and lack real substance);
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Private Clubs and Public Judges: A Nonsubstantive Debate About
Symbols, 59 TEx. L. REv. 733 (1981).
12 6 See infra note 129.
127 "Parchment barrier" was Madison's characterization of state bills of rights that had
been "violated by overbearing majorities in every state." Johnson, Beyond the Second
Amendment, supra note 92, at 28 n.80. Notably, Madison's concern seems to have been
majoritarian tyranny damaging the interests of an elite minority of creditors. Eric Black
presents in entertaining fashion the indications that our Constitution emerged as a limiting
instrument aimed at controlling such "abuses of democracy." See ERIc BLACK, OUR
CONSnTUmON: THm Myr THAT BnqDs Us 45-58 (1988). It is ironic that those limitations
may now be most useful to oppressed minorities.
1590 [Vol. 57:1555
PLENARY POWER
preposterousness of its subject-the presumption that a political world can be
constructed and controlled with words." And, in the face of a determined
political will, constitutions written or unwritten... may be "absurd
attempts... to limit a power in its own nature illimitable." 128
The rhetorical fidelity to limited power that is more comfortably part of
"traditional" constitutionalism 129 is therefore appealing only if principled 130
application of it puts a heavier trigger on majoritarian excesses. Is it reasonable
to expect such fidelity to operate as a real barrier, a restraining commitment
majorities must overcome before using their power to excess?
Such a barrier is very much in the style of the ideals critical race theorists
argue helped shame America into the corrections of the Civil Rights era. In his
most recent bibliography, Richard Delgado describes the effort to resist the
critical legal studies disparagement of rights rhetoric as a major theme in critical
race theory.' 3 ' One of the earliest and most prominent of these projects is
Kimberle Crenshaw's qualified defense of rights rhetoric against critical legal
studies trashing. She describes rights rhetoric as certainly flawed, indeed
double-edged, but still a vital vehicle for minority advances:
[Crits suggest] that thinking in terms of rights is incompatible with feelings of
solidarity and is not helpful in determining how to be politically effective. The
expression of rights, however, was a central organizing feature of the civil
rights movement....
12 8 James E. Fleming, We the ExceptionalAmerican People, 11 CONSr. COMMENTARY
355, 377 (1994) (quoting WUmm F. HARRis, II, THE IhTERRErABLE CoNsTrrrUnoN 1
(1993) and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). Earlier, Professor
Fleming invokes John Rawls on the same point. Id. at 361. Fleming also offers John Hart
Ely's observation that, "[C]ourts will tend to be swept along by the same sorts of fears as
citizens." Id. at 376 n.94.
129 1 use "traditional constitutionalism" here to connote broadly a more formalist
approach to constructing power boundaries and respecting individual rights. This vision puts
great value on textual guides and restraints on power and would attempt to minimize the
influence of contemporary politics, problems, and necessities.
The more that is endured (whether inconvenience, political disappointment, or social
frustration) in fidelity to this ideal, the greater the capacity of the ideal to restrain future
exercises of power that upon reflection people of goodwill would find troublesome.
130 And there is a difference! For one thing, principled limits on federal power would
require that both ends of the political spectrum sacrifice power interests. Thus, only a Ninth
or a Tenth Amendment ascension is insufficient. The barrier to abuse of which I speak
requires real collective self-discipline-the type that takes seriously those constitutional
limitations and instructions we dislike until they are changed through the long, formal process
of amending Article V.
131 See Delgado & Stefancic, Critical Race Theory 1993, supra note 4, at 191.
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... As demonstrated in the civil rights movement, engaging in rights
rhetoric can be an attempt to turn society's "institutional logic" against itself-
to redeem some of the rhetorical promises and the self-congratulations that
seem to thrive in American political discourse....
... Powerless people can sometimes trigger such a crisis by challenging
an institution internally, that is, by using its own logic against it. Such crisis
occurs when powerless people force open and politicize a contradiction
between the dominant ideology and their reality.
Casting racial issues in the moral and legal rights rhetoric of the prevailing
ideology helped create the political controversy without which the state's
coercive function would not have been enlisted to aid Blacks....
... Perhaps the only situation in which powerless people may receive any
favorable response is where there is a political or ideological need to restore an
image of fairness that has somehow been tarnished. 132
What Crenshaw and others describe 133 is the collective self-restraint that
grows from cultural commitment to the ideal of rights, and the power of that
ideal to transform a conflicting reality. Conceptual interdependence reveals
cultural and institutional fidelity to the constitution's explicit power boundaries
as the flip side to the rights coin. 134 Deep cultural and institutional conviction
132 Crenshaw, supra note 5, at 1364-68, 1381 (emphasis added). Crenshaw emphasizes
that liberal reform, harnessing rights rhetoric, both "transforms and legitimates" the social
order. Id. at 1370. Reliance on the restraining value of a limited power model seems similarly
double-edged.
133 See generally PATRICIA J. WUAMS, TiM ALaMY OF RACE AND RIGHTIS 149
(1991) (arguing that although rights may not be ends in themselves, rights rhetoric has been
and continues to be an effective form of discourse for blacks); Mary L. Dudziak,
Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1988) (arguing that the U.S.
government's support for desegregation and racial equality was motivated in part by the
concern that racial discrimination harmed foreign relations, and that the U.S. could not
effectively argue that democracy was morally superior to communism while still practicing
segregation); Mary L. Dudziak, The Limits of Good Faith: Desegregation in Topeka, Kansas,
1950-1956, 5 LAW & Hisr. REV. 351 (1987) (arguing that school board's integration effort
was taken to distance itself from the "real" segregation in the south and thus was aimed
primarily at protecting the majority community's self-image); Patricia J. Williams,
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 Hv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 401 (1987) (arguing that critical legal studies' disdain for rights-based theory ignores the
utility of rights-assertion to minorities).
134 Such fidelity would, for example, operate in stark contrast to the current
congressional practice of assuming the power to act and often failing even to identify the
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that there will be immensely prudent and apparently necessary things that the
Constitution flatly prohibits is vital to instilling the collective self-discipline that
may be the core barrier to majoritarian abuses. 135 This cultural harness on
collective power is, like rights rhetoric, a dangerous thing for American
minorities to sacrifice. 136
The effect of this harness is surely transitory. It is hard to know by how
much cultural fidelity to substantive power boundaries will delay majoritarian
excesses. 137 Certainly it is insufficient to continuously restrain a roughly-
spurred majority. But with this guard in place, the majority will endure a harder
kick-a keener perception of necessity-before unleashing its destructive
power. Both conceptually and practically, this potential is such that brown
people can move aggressively toward a more formalist power-limiting
constitutionalism without phasing out of voice.
In contrast, the plenary power model not only is geared to unleash
majoritarian excesses earlier, 138 it poses a quite independent danger. Karl
purported constitutional source of the power enabling particular legislation. With the,
commerce power as a virtual rubber stamp, see Epstein, supra note 9, perhaps this is not
surprising. Identifying and debating repeatedly and publicly the power source of federal
legislation would be one small step toward institutional and cultural fidelity to power-limiting
principles.
135 Eric Black makes the point in a comparison between the United States and the
former Soviet Union:
The Soviet Union has a Constitution. It guarantees democratic elections and a republican
form of government. Soviet citizens have-on paper-most of the same constitutional
rights and liberties as Americans.
... We have a Constitution; they have a Constitution. Ours says freedom; theirs
says freedom. Yet we believe that somehow ours produces real freedom and theirs
doesn't.
BLACK, supra note 127, at 169.
Learned Hand put it more eloquently: "Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women;
when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it." Learned Hand, The Spirit of
Liberty, in THE SPin" oF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSEs OF LEARNED HAND 190 (Irving
Dullard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
136 A commitment to respect certain rights when they are painfully expensive, a resolve
to say we deeply wish to act but may not, and self-restraint in the face of exigency are
valuable collective ideals. They would recognize collective power as a blunt instrument with
great potential to do damage, even when wielded with good intentions.
137 There is also no assurance that it will only delay "excesses" as minorities perceived
them.138 This threat is no doubt submerged by the benefits American minorities have received
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Llewellyn observed that "what one has been doing acquires in due course
another flavor, another level of value than mere practice; a flavor on the level
of policy or ethics or morality. What one has been doing, becomes the 'right
thing to do."' 139
The danger of the plenary power constitutionalism is not just that the
majority will abuse power earlier. The higher danger is that what is
"necessary" becomes right, proper, and moral, leaving nothing at all to regret
or re-examine. 140
Baldwin commented that "no man is a villain in his own eyes." 141
Unrestrained by fidelity to power-limiting principles, majorities under the
plenary power model are left to recognize their excesses by reference only to
the measures of prudence or necessity. People for whom Baldwin's observation
resonates, groups whose fortunes have turned on collective panic, 142 those who
have been cast as a problem needing a solution, 143 might well find this lack of
principled restraint troubling 144 enough to merit rejection of the plenary power
from progressive policies supported by the plenary power model. But we must recognize the
model is merely a tool. There is no reason to think it will be employed exclusively by
progressives, or by wise progressives, or that progressive ideology is ultimately "best" for us.139 KARL LLEWELLYN, TBE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON THE LAw AND ITS STUDY 71 (1950).
140 True, the majority might amend the Constitution to achieve whatever it desires. The
difference is that amendment logistically is so difficult and time consuming that it imposes a
period of reflection and is resistant to panic in a way that mere congressional action is not.
14 1 See Eugene B. Redmon, The Way Love Never Dies, in JAMES BAIDWIN: THE
LEGACY 91 (Quincy Groupe ed., 1989).
142 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). One of my colleagues
has lamented his students' lack of outrage at Korematsu. Of course I cannot say for certain
what feeds their relative complacency. What I fear, however, is that their response reflects a
level of comfort with the idea that our national government is empowered to and should do
whatever necessary to address national problems and emergencies. By that standard, one need
only concede that we were at war to find Korematsu unfortunate but unavoidable, and
therefore relatively unproblematic.
143 See WLLIAM S. McFEELY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 371 (1992). McFeely writes:
"'Men talk of the Negro problem,' Douglass roared. 'There is no Negro problem. The
problem is whether the American people have loyalty enough, honor enough, patriotism
enough to live up to their own constitution."' Id.
144 See also Robert Williams's critique of Congress's express plenary power over Native
Americans. Discussing some of the evils committed in the name of that power, he argues that
history cannot be swept aside with the counsel to "trust us." See Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to
Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 439
(1988); see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law
and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social ills?, 77 CoRNEL L. REV. 1258,
1258-61 (1992) (arguing that the marketplace of free speech intensifies rather than relieves
[Vol. 57:15551594
PLENARY POWER
model in favor of principled application of more formalist conceptions of the
constitution's power-limiting role. 145
Rebecca Brown's tribute to Justice Marshall underscores the point.
Discussing Marshall's formalist sympathies and noting that formalism is an
"odd slant" for a social revolutionary, Brown describes the impulse for
Marshall's particular brand of formalism:
[Marshall] combined the principled righteousness of formalism with the
wisdom of realism, creating a jurisprudence that is entirely his own....
But Justice Marshall appears to recognize that "formalism is only
superficially about rigidity and absurdity. More fundamentally, it is about
power and its allocation." One of his principles mandates that rules be obeyed
because, on balance, adherence to rules tends to help those without power,
while discretion in the hands of the powerful is a frightening thing. Rules are
rules. "'It is the unpopular or beleaguered individual-not the man in power-
who has the greatest stake in the integrity of the law.'" 146
B. Outsiders, Outcasts, and the Risks of Our Traditional Power-Limiting
Structure
As a practical political matter, revival of federal power boundaries, the
risks of a more formalist, power-limiting structure, and the potential ascension
of the outcast provisions might be viewed as offering American minorities very
little. The racist baggage of states' rights-the indelible image of George
the predicament of American minorities and that the "empathic fallacy" encourages the
erroneous belief that free expression will remedy racism and other deeply inscribed social
ins).
145 This discussion focuses of course on federal power restraints. Arguably, for most of
our history in this country, dangers to minorities came in the form of individual, local, state,
and regional exercises of power. The power balance now has profoundly shifted, and we are
warranted in asking whether the federal mechanism is susceptible to similar abuse. After the
corrections of the reconstruction amendments and the civil rights era, and considering the new
challenges we face as a polity, minorities now can fairly reconsider the utility of the original
limitations on federal power.
Consider for a moment the operation of the plenary power model prompted by
majoritarian fears sufficient to give someone a step to the right of Pat Buchanan a mandate to
restore the good ole days in America. Fenced borders might be one of the milder aspects of
such a program. Brown people in particular might find other measures deemed "necessary"
(and therefore proper within the plenary power structure) by such leadership to solve national
problems to be deeply disturbing.
146 Rebecca L. Brown, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall: Or: How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love Formalism, 1 TEMPLE POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 7, 16-17 (1992)
(citations omitted).
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Wallace standing at the school house door and contemplation of the modem
social and political landscape absent federal intervention-alone might be
sufficient to sustain minority adherence to plenary power constitutionalism that
reduced states' rights to rubble.' 47
Depending on whether one is a rural minority for whom public security
resources are more demonstrably irrelevant to individual safetyl48 or an urban
minority besieged by crime and grasping for solutions, an outsider perspective
147 We should appreciate however, that one very good test of whether we are guided by
principles rather than simply preferences is whether we adhere to results to which we are led,
even those we do not necessarily like. Christopher Eisgruber has called this "Henry
Monaghan's 'no pain no claim' test." (The idea that a constitutional theory loses credibility
unless its advocate suffers some pain by acknowledging it does not achieve everything he
would like.) See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinlng the Constitutional
Relation Between Principle and Prudence, 43 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (1993) (discussing Henry P.
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 53, 395 (1981)).
But even assuming the Tenth Amendment offers brown people nothing but trouble, is
that sufficient to force us irretrievably into the-arms of the plenary power model? With the
drastic changes we witnessed in Washington after November 1994, a model which limits
federal power and offers options to hospitable states has some appeal. See also McFLY,
supra note 143, at 255:
What Douglass meant by this impatient statement was that the Civil Rights Act of 1866
and the proposed Fourteenth Amendment did not give a "final" answer to his immense
question. Curiously, he did not view the answer as coming from vigorous federal
enforcement of those remarkable measures. Instead this black abolitionist looked to
states' rights, of all things: "The arm of the Federal government is long, but it is too
short to protect the rights of individuals in the interior of distant states. They must have
the power to protect themselves." The power would be theirs when African Americans
had the vote and could elect sympathetic local and state officials.
Id. Throughout this account, McFeely shows Douglass benefiting from hospitable state
enclaves.
Whether brown people benefit from plenary federal power depends on who is employing
it. If our friends are in power then maybe we can expect national policy to force states into
conformity with uniform standards of equality and fairness. But the reverse is true as well. If,
nationally, minority fortunes are on the decline, we might expect moves toward uniformity
that run against our interests. I have commented earlier on the risks to brown people of an
untethered federal power wielded by a "radical right regime with a .mandate to 'restore
America to the traditions that made it great."' See Johnson, supra note 21, at 575 n.119.
Contemplate, for a moment, the agenda of a deeply conservative regime, on the offensive,
wielding the sword of plenary power. Might we at some point look favorably upon individual
states' latitude to adopt a progressive race agenda, building on a base of remedial measures
being neglected at the federal level?
148 See Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment, supra note 92, at 23-25 nn.63, 67.
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might yield different conclusions about the individual fights view of the Second
Amendment. 149 A rural perspective 150 might well leave one troubled by the
ironic analytical foundation of liberal gun prohibition advocacy-which among
other things proposes federal prohibitions that would leave minorities security-
dependent on the very state and local powers that still cause many to shudder at
the mention of "states' rights." 151 Many urban minorities, with at least
symbolic political representation, besieged by the message that only cops and
criminals have any connection to guns, might view armed self-help as wholly
foreign.152 And, even an alternative view of the Second Amendment, casting
the militia as a manifestation of republican virtue but dismissing the value of
individual self defense, which some might argue can be drawn from a
principled formalist constitutionalism, may hold little attraction for many
minorities.' 53
The Ninth Amendment appears to hold the most promise for American
minorities, particularly if one views the Ninth Amendment as a source both of
positive rights to government services154 and unenumerated fundamental rights
149 See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Revitalization of the Militia of the
Whole, A Step in Rebuilding Republican Virtue in Inner-City Minority Communities (1995)
[hereinafter Cottrol & Diamond, Revitalization] (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(arguing for revival of the militia of the whole as a component of revitalizing blighted
minority communities).
150 See generally Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment:
Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEo. L.J. 309 (1991) [hereinafter Cottrol &
Diamond, Reconsideration].
151 See also Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendnent, supra note 92, at 57 n.181.
152 The same political currents that supported George Wallace at the school house door
also contributed to a decline in Second Amendment protections for brown people. Professors
Cottrol and Diamond chronicle a history of racist disarmament efforts aimed at leaving brown
people defenseless and subservient. See generally Cottrol & Diamond, Reconsideration, supra
note 150; Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, "Never Intended to Be Applied to the
White Population": Firearns Regulation and Racial Disparity-The Redeemed South's
Legacy to a National Jurisprudence, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1307 (1995) [hereinafter Cottrol
& Diamond, Firearms Regulation]. Disarmament has been a common expression of
majoritarian apprehension about "others." This apprehension is illustrated in Joyce Malcolm's
history of a decline of the English right to bear arms corresponding to an increasingly
heterogeneous population and decline of shared ideology. See MALCOLM, supra note 92, at
170-71. David Kopel identifies a similar majoritarian apprehension as a unifying theme in the
disarmament efforts of various nations. See generally DAVID KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE
MouNTE AND mE CowBoY (1993).153 But see Cottrol & Diamond, Revitalization, supra note 149.
154 In a substantial way, progressive constitutionalism should resonate for American
minorities. Raoul Berger's critique of it explains why: "Implicit in [Suzanna] Sherry's fancy
theorizing [about the rights creating judicial activism invited by the Ninth Amendment] and
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operable against states. But as discussed above, a traditionalist construction of
the Ninth Amendment could avoid that outcome by constraining it to its residual
rights conception. 155
Perhaps the most compelling reason for minority support of the plenary
power model is that modem civil rights statutes are grounded on an expansive
reading of the Commerce Clause-a reading that is the foundation of plenary
power constitutionalism. 156 While it might be possible to sustain parts of this
agenda through a generous reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, we must
recognize that the difficulty of regulating private action from a Fourteenth
Amendment base was a central reason for grounding the Civil Rights Act of
1964 on the Commerce Clause. 157 Gerald Gunther suggests that the Thirteenth
Amendment, at least as construed subsequently, might now support the 1964
Act's ambitions to regulate private action. 158 Even so, it seems vastly less
equipped than the modem Commerce Clause to support a progressive race
agenda for the future. 159
Moreover, even if minorities resolve concerns about ascension of the
outcast provisions and the condition of civil rights legislation, there remains the
risk that one will be appropriated as a colored poster child16 who, by
criticizing the plenary power model, validates an agenda that ranges beyond the
that of her fellows is a confession of failure to obtain from the people the measures they
desire." Berger, supra note 80, at 60-61.
155 See supra Part II.A.2.
156 Rogers Smith contends, "The Court's affirmation of the Civil Rights Act [of 1964]
confirmed the disappearance of any real limits on the commerce power." ROGERS M. SMrrH,
LIBERAIsM AND AmERIcAN CONSrITTONAL LAW 162 (1985).157 See GERALD GuNrTm, CONSITIuFONAL LAW 145-51 (12th ed. 1991).
158 Id. (citing the Supreme Court's construction of the Thirteenth Amendment in Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)).
159 There are other pathways through which we might try to respect limits on collective
power and still sustain the special steps necessary to push America to some semblance of
adherence to its founding ideals; none of them are entirely satisfactory. One route to
sustaining these things in a limited power model would be a recognition of and scrupulous
adherence to an idea presented roughly in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1976)-the
temporary expansion of federal powers in narrowly circumscribed cases that qualify as true
emergencies. The difficulty is that those members of the majority who would concede the
need to heal the wounds of our racist past are also likely to lose their discipline and argue that
many other social problems are also qualifying national emergencies. And one suspects that
those who would apply this temporary emergency power with any discipline would be
insensitive to the contention that racism presents such an emergency.
160 Both liberals and conservatives have wheeled out the colored poster child. The
differences are that liberals seem to take him for granted, and the liberal political agenda
presents fewer outright affronts to brown people.
1598 [Vol. 57:1555
PLENARY POWER
choice of constitutional models. 161 In theory, that problem yields to clear
boundaries between one's support of the traditional power-limiting ideals of the
Constitution and aspects of conservative ideology deemed objectionable. As a
coarse political matter, such distinctions may be too subtle to function. 162
It is then difficult to conclude that minority adherence to the plenary power
model is an unsound choice. Indeed, it is very easy to understand how it has
become the centerpiece of orthodox views of good political strategy.
C. Toward a View of Voice Utility
The plenary power model and formalist power-limiting constitutionalism
are both worrisome. A preference for either has implications across a multitude
of race and class issues. A critique of these options in the voice of color does
not generate a "correct" choice. This result is one indication that voice is ill-
equipped to drive doctrinal choices.
But the choices prompted by the plenary power paradox, while broad in
their implications, do not cover the field of social, political, and doctrinal
choices that critical race scholars can fruitfully engage in voice. Evaluation of
that larger constellation of choices might show that the dilemmas presented by
plenary power constitutionalism do not indicate a general inability of voice to
drive results. And I happily concede that the critical empirical analysis that this
question requires should be only one facet of a broad debate about the capacity
of voice to dictate results.
My aim here is to prime that debate through an argument that moves
toward verifying the broad claim that voice is not equipped to compel results.
The argument calls on knowledge that grows from the bond of which DuBois
spoke-"[something] between us that constitutes a tie which I can feel better
than I can explain"163-something at a deep level we always have known.
Ironically, a good illustration comes through an evaluation of two American
minorities who have come to symbolize voice and antivoice: Derrick Bell and
Clarence Thomas.
161 This problem is recurrent when brown people step outside their traditional
ideological corral. For example, I am sure that Derrick Bell's provocative suggestion that
Civil Rights lawyers abandon their preoccupation with integration at any cost and instead
pursue their clients' wishes for a better education for their children, would delight many white
separatists. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
162 It seems brown people are allowed much less divergence from the traditional liberal
agenda than whites before being kicked out of camp and labeled conservative. Liberals
demand more of their poster child.163 DAWD a G w, W.E.B. DuBois: BIOGRAHY OFA RAcE 15 (1994).
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Social scientists Clayton P. Alderfer and David A. Thomas have observed
that minorities utilize a variety of coping strategies to deal with racism. One of
these is denial.' 64 I witnessed this style of coping through the performances of
my paternal grandmother, who took it to the point of inversion. Sitting in the
middle of Appalachia, she still speaks with condescending sympathy of "the
poor white folks" and their unenviable position in the universe.' 65 Justice
Thomas and many others are engaged in a similar denial strategy with profound
policy implications. 166 The denial strategy substantially impacts individual
social, political, and doctrinal choices pushing "color blind" decisions in a
severely color conscious society. 167
Derrick Bell offers a different but equally troublesome coping strategy. He
suggests that brown people simply come to grips with their inevitable
subordination and work to find ways to make their subordinate existence
bearable: i6 8
164 See Alderfer & Thomas, supra note 5, at 9.
165 1 do not use "denial" as a pejorative. A more typical rendition is described in a short
report on Alma Powell: "She succeeded in part because she was mentored by powerful,
directed adults who never for a moment considered themselves inferior to anyone." Eric
Pooley, Why Alma Didn't Want the Job, TIME, Nov. 20, 1995, at 50 (reporting Colin
Powell's decision not to run for President).
166T'e strategy often is embellished with the idea that one's response to current
episodes of racism should be the equivalent of the Mike Schmidt response to the cooked ball.
If they cook the ball, the best response is just to powder it. Steven Carter has noted that those
who have benefited most from affirmative action were in the best position to respond to the
cooked ball by at least making contact. See STEPmEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN
AnFwTiAVE ACTiON BABY 71-84 (1991). It should be no mystery that some of these people
employ the denial coping strategy. The very idea of affirmative action clashes with the denial
strategy, so its role is diminished, disparaged, condemned. Of course this presupposes
someone with a fair chance to powder the cooked ball. And that is why denial is
controversial. The ball is so severely cooked that many of us cannot even make contact.
167 One alternative to this denial coping strategy is the degrading but essential exhibition
of one's wounds and misery in order to extract sympathy, assistance, and reparation. This
alternative has been a discouragingly essential part of the traditional civil rights response to
the legacy of slavery and racism.
168 See Derrick Bell, Jr., Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363, 377 (1992). The
extensions of Bell's strategy (to expect inequality and not wear oneself out fighting inevitable
racism) threaten a central component of individual achievement-the will to continue when
things look bleak. One of the things that permits people to push through barriers is a sense
that the barrier can be broken. Under Bell's strategy we lose that sense of the possible. And
worse, we are encouraged to face even weak obstacles with a sense of predestined failure.
Several of my most memorable "racial incidents" of the past few years I have produced
for myself. Each involved my joining one private sporting club or another (hunting, shooting,
archery, swimming) in venues where I was a very distinct minority. Before proceeding, I
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Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even those herculean
efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary "peaks of
progress," short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns
adapt in ways that maintain white dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact that
all history verifies. We must acknowledge it and move on to adopt policies
based on what I call: "Racial Realism." This mindset or philosophy requires us
to acknowledge the permanence of our subordinate status. 1 6 9
This strategy is decidedly retrograde. The first encounter with it that I recall
in detail was as a child in the car with one of my uncles on the way to Sunday
school. My uncle muttered under his breath as a fellow we knew waved happily
while running a stop sign in front of us. I had recently learned the meaning of
the letters on the red and white sign, and announced, "He can't do that!" My
uncle looked at me gravely and said, "That man can do whatever he wants.
That man is a white man." He was reminding me of something much more
serious than the rules of the road. It was a realist survival lesson, somewhat
contrived, about "how things are," that diminished and hardened my young self
image.
This experience was the foundation of a stack of confirmations that I should
not expect the benefit of the golden rule, standard social courtesies, welcome
signs, and advertisements to "come on down." 170 These ego-corroding survival
contemplated and steeled myself for potential hostilities. I was prepared for conflict and in a
correspondingly foul mood. Ultimately, the only unpleasant things were those that I had
anticipated in preparation for battle. The reality was benign.
Importantly, my expectations were laced with a core sense that, while I might be in
hostile territory, I was at least equal to my putative adversaries and could make powerful
demands for equal treatment. Had I accepted the "reality of my subordination," I might well
have simply stayed home and avoided the demons of my anticipation.
I use these examples not to diminish continuing real incidents of racism, but to
emphasize the power of those we imagine. My recent encounter with four jack-booted thugs
of the New York City Police Department-where I played the standard role of the black male
who "looks just like somebody"-replenished my cache of real racial incidents. Although I
told them my name, they dubbed me "Buck." The threatening response when I objected to
this mode of address was the first point at which I became really afraid. As they talked over
me, my captors made clear their conviction that, even if I hadn't done this, I had "done
something." The uniformed officer in the front seat found my complaints about the tightness
of the handcuffs hilarious. My next meeting with these mammals will be before a judge: but
on my initiative. This time, they will be the suspects.
16 9 Id. at 373-74.
17 0 Later, when I suggested we actually go to one of those places that invited everyone
to "come on down," another relative explained, without any trace of bitterness, as if he were
discussing the sun coming up, "That doesn't mean us." He had come to grips with his
subordination.
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lessons cautioned that the game is rigged and implied that to play could only
yield disappointment. Many of us might conclude that the doctrinal, political,
social, and personal choices that seem to flow from such convictions are
troublesome. 171
Bell's realism and Thomas's denial are both old saws. Both are renditions
of strategies brown people traditionally have used to cope with racism. They
compel a divergent array of political, doctrinal, and social choices. Most
importantly, both reflect the truly desperate nature of our common efforts to
cope with racism and a cacophony of racist signals, explicit, inferred, and
imagined, that minorities encounter daily. 172
That we can understand both approaches as the outgrowth of unremarkable
reactions to racism is instructive. These common but drastically different coping
strategies show that brown people are, to different degrees and in different
ways, struggling painfully at the intersection of the broad phenomenon of
racism, our particular race experiences, and the multitude of individual qualities
and traits that influence our reaction to those experiences. It is this complex
intersection of characteristics and stimuli that form voice. Voice surely prompts
us to engage particular issues more fully, and to wrestle harder with particular
social, political, and doctrinal choices. But it is difficult to conclude that voice
in all its complexity is equipped to dictate for minorities uniform social,
political, or doctrinal preferences or to construct an orthodoxy of color. 173 It is
171 1 recognize fully the conflict between my grandmother's lesson and that of my uncle.
And I appreciate the difficulty of successfully implementing the denial strategy unless one
never leaves the house. The conflict illustrates that these coping strategies are substantially
acts of desperation, not coherent strategic systems.
172 Which message is more hazardous as a brown child's roadmap through modem
America? While most of Bell's statement is the essence of despair, his final vision is, while
clouded, finally hopeful. By acknowledging our inevitably subordinate status, we might
"avoid despair and [free ourselves] to imagine and even implement racial strategies that can
bring fulfillment and even triumph." Bell, supra note 168, at 373-74. In this hope Bell is no
different from others along the spectrum of political views-all of them hoping against hope
that the desperate unlikely paths they are cutting will lead to triumph. In this hope, Bell's
realism, Thomas's bootstrap philosophy, see id. at 370 (discussing Thomas's bootstrap
philosophy), and the civil rights organizations Bell describes as "unhappily... committed to
the ideology of racial equality," id. at 377, have much in common. If we acknowledge and
celebrate it, this core commonality might be enough to draw us together at least long enough
to recognize we are all working on the same problem. Our disparate strategies may be
noncomplementary; they may clash frontally. Yet they are driven by the same impulse. As
Bell points out, none of us yet has devised a winning strategy. And it is a very sound bet that
no single strategy will be the answer for tens of millions of brown people. It seems essential
that our collective kit of strategies includes more than one pattern.
173 The bar to an orthodoxy of color may be a purely practical one. Even if we all have
1602 [Vol. 57:1555
PLENARY POWER
more likely that our preferences among disparate choices are a product of the
collision between our peculiar race experiences and all the things that make us
unique individuals. 174
As we can observe from a parallel struggle in feminist legal theory, 175 none
of this diminishes the importance of voice. Tracy Higgins describes the efforts
of feminist scholars who have contended with the criticism that there can be no
single "feminist truth. "176 A dominant response is that feminism should be a
privileged voice because the process of feminist critique may, for example,
raise consciousness and thereby more completely reflect women's experiences
similar experiences, we all cannot react the same way, and our experience is only roughly
similar. Compare the diverse responses of students to the relatively controlled, intense
experience of the first year in law school. See also Alderfer & Thomas, supra note 5, at 3
(discussing the tremendous effect of group pressure on how individuals perceive subjective
and objective phenomena). Many arguments about people phasing in and out of voice are
caused by someone's departure from the views of the pressure group. Particularly in
academia, this individual departure is not surprising, since one of the coping styles that helps
individuals resist group pressure is "great confidence in [one's] own judgment [and
withdrawal] from group pressures." Id. The nature of the academy and of the people drawn to
it correlate highly with this coping mechanism.
174 This idea seems no different than Robin Barnes's observation that there is no typical
black woman law professor, even though many in the academic world expect black women
professors to hold similar views. See Robin D. Barnes, Black Women Law Professors and
Critical Self Consciousness: A Tribute to Professor Denise S. Carty-Bennia, 6 BEREL
WOMEN's L.J. 57 (1990-1991).
Some critical race scholars have taken a contrary position, seeming to suggest this
problem is one of adequate definition of categories. See generally Angela Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990) (criticizing Robin West
and Catharine MacKinnon for implicitly assuming the commonality of all women and failing
to appreciate the distinct identity of black women). The same critique applies to a grouping of
all black women.
My own rendition of Harris's tune is that current critical race theory is tinged by an
urban bias and fails to take proper account of the subcategory of rural, Bible-Belt minorities.
If we keep winding this machine, eventually we describe the full combination of traits,
experiences, and characteristics that produce the divergent reactions to racism that cleave us.
This does not invalidate, but does constrain, the scope of our efforts to generalize about
perspectives of color. Giving proper recognition to our differences, we can say that American
minorities have had a roughly similar encounter with racism. That experience, broadly
speaking, will heighten our sensitivity to a wide range of questions, problems, and impulses.
But it is an extraordinary leap to conclude that these rough similarities will dictate precisely
how we engage those questions, problems, and impulses.
175 Alex Johnson contends that "much can be learned from a comparison of Critical
Race Theory and Feminist Theory." Johnson, supra note 6, at 2062.
176 See Tracy Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex": Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and
Justice, 80 CoRNELL L. REv. 1536, 1588 (1995).
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less distorted by patriarchy. 177
While the idea of an orthodoxy of color is as dubious as a feminist
orthodoxy, exercises in voice, like feminist critiques, remain vital. The
important thing is that the trails they cut toward particular conclusions may be
decidedly unorthodox, revealing new pathways through doctrinal or policy
schemes. 178 More likely it is the pathways it creates, not the conclusions
rendered, that ultimately will prove the value of voice. 179
V. CONCLUSION
From a majoritarian perspective, plenary power constitutionalism might be
relatively unproblematic and even attractive. It presents rights as necessarily
flexible barriers on collective power, restraining conceptions to be laid aside
where they obstruct prudent, necessary uses of power. And, indeed, it has
generated an array of benevolent and beneficial exercises of power that have
advanced minority interests. But there is nothing about it that commands or
guarantees such results.
Minorities, who have benefited from the exercise of power that we do not
control, are forced to gamble on how that power will be used next. 180 Our
social, doctrinal, and policy preferences are merely working experiments that
incorporate our wagers about future uses of this power. It seems inevitable that
our strategies and our wagers will differ, and in combination with all the things
that make us different, will produce a broad array of divergent preferences and
choices.
Brown people share one thing. We are all, to varying degrees, playing
against the house. This commonality is insufficient to produce unified strategies.
But it ought to be enough to keep us talking with and helping one another
despite our differences. 181
177 Id. at 1588-89.
178 See, e.g., Cottrol & Diamond, Revitalization, supra note 149; Cottrol & Diamond,
Firearns Regulation, supra note 152.
179 If the debate in the social sciences is any indication, we will continue to argue over
the existence and importance of voice of color, notwithstanding Alex Johnson's declaration
that the question is settled. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 2061-62; Alderfer & Thomas, supra
note 5, at 23-26 (noting that, from the early 1970s through today, the importance of the
researcher's racial identity on his research has been hotly debated).
180 Morton Horwitz argues that "rights are a double edged sword." See Horwitz, supra
note 104, at 396 (responding to minority scholars' challenge of critical legal studies criticisms
of rights theories). But powers are also double edged.
181 One of the obvious themes of this project has been the validation of departures by
brown people from traditional political allegiances. Partly this is geared to do the good work
1604 [Vol. 57:1555
PLENARY POWER
of stereotype busting. But very candidly, my own movement away from traditional allies on
the left has been prompted significantly by liberal disparagement of the Second Amendment
and denigration of the value of self-help in the pursuit of individual security. My perspective
on this issue is driven by my formative experiences as a statistically insignificant minority in
the West Virginia mountains. My journey in America since leaving those mountains has only
bolstered my conviction that the personal capacity to mount a violent defense to physical
threats to my family and myself is the very last thing I will sacrifice to lofty social
experiments or utopian political agendas. I have written in detail why I think the liberal dream
of safety for all of us, through gun regulation and gun prohibition, is a pipedream that is
impossible to implement and will make things worse. See generally Johnson, Shots, supra
note 92; Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment, supra note 92; Nicholas J. Johnson, Gun
Controls-in America?, Tm PU. Nm L. REv. 207 (1993) (reviewing KoPEL, supra
note 152).
Ironically this conviction and my scholarship supporting the individual rights view of the
Second Amendment has pushed me toward political allegiances with some of the very people
who prompt my desire for a means to respond in kind to violent threats. But more than that, it
has pushed me away from what I have come to view as bothersome, wrongheaded, and
damaging liberal paternalism-away from that, but toward what?. As I watched the
phenomenon of Colin Powell while working on this Article in the fall of 1995, I was hopeful
that I saw glimmers of an answer. But during the winter of 1996 1 digested the frightening
spectacle and rhetoric of Pat Buchanan.
On these issues my skin is thicker than most. But I find myself increasingly skeptical
about the capacity of popular political conservatism to treat race issues with even a modicum
of sensitivity. I am equally skeptical about its capacity to produce the culture of principled
collective self-restraint that I have argued is a vital component in the protection of minority
interests. This skepticism does not change my critique of the danger of plenary power. Indeed
it underscores the danger of such power when driven by fear and anger and harnessed by
demagogues.
My heightened skepticism does change one thing. I am no longer willing (either in the
interest of stereotype busting or out of resentment against liberals who rush to kick me out of
the club for my Second Amendment views) to permit the inference that my work reflects
broad sympathies with the conservative agenda in its current configuration. I guess I must
continue voting for myself.
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